On Jul 11, 2016, at 3:46 AM, Jaap Keuter <jaap.keuter@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Since (not so) recently the Coverity code analysis has added a checker for so called tainted data. This data is considered coming from an external source (eg. the network) hence suspicious until validated. Using these tainted values is considered a risk. In general this is true, Wireshark on the other hand is intended and designed to handle suspicious / (very) possibly wrong network data (that’s what we’re using it for, amongst other things). So even though data is tainted, many cases the use of the TVB, etc. protects us from the problems envisioned by the checker writers.
>
> So what to so with these Coverity issues. Before we start to implement all kinds of arbitrary checks (duplicating effort already handled by the tvb code) and limits (mostly arbitrary) we should consider is this checker is really valuable in this context.
For what it's worth, CIDs 1363031 and 1363032, for example, have complaints about "tainted" data, and they were real bugs.
The Coverity reports did *not* do a good job of reporting the *real* problems for those two CIDs, which is that the code was assuming that some item's length field had a value <= X, for some value of X, and wasn't bothering to check whether it was > X and reporting an error in that case rather than blithely treating (X - value) as if it were the length of the remaining data even if it happens to be negative.
However, if the complaint is just due to Coverity not realizing that we *are* doing the necessary checks, we should find some way to tell Coverity "trust us".