[Wireshark code review <code-review-do-not-reply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

URL: https://code.wireshark.org/review/gitweb?p=wireshark.git;a=commit;h=9402f2f80c6bc7d25178a0875c5a1f5ee36361db
Submitter: Guy Harris (guy@xxxxxxxxxxxx)
Changed: branch: master-2.2
Repository: wireshark

Commits:

9402f2f by Peter Wu (peter@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):

    ber: clamp BER lengths to avoid integer overflow
    
    Many callers treat the length as signed integer, so ensure that the
    length fits in such a number. Failure to do so can have unintended
    consequences (such as calling "tvb_memdup(tvb, 0, -1)" and assuming that
    the length is actually 2^32-1).
    
    Although an exception could be thrown as well, let's give the caller a
    chance to handle this themselves.
    
    Change-Id: If92545f7d3603250f75741040435000ba879b7e3
    Ping-Bug: 14682
    Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/27563
    Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
    Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@xxxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 67c642047362b5e2546259dd012622ff3dd6c9d9)
    Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/27967
    Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
    

Actions performed:

    from  723abd3   ber: fix buffer overrun (read) in dissect_ber_constrained_bitstring
    adds  9402f2f   ber: clamp BER lengths to avoid integer overflow


Summary of changes:
 epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)