Wireshark-bugs: [Wireshark-bugs] [Bug 12752] New: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on add
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 20:30:39 +0000
Bug ID | 12752 |
---|---|
Summary | AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffee55f4350 |
Product | Wireshark |
Version | Git |
Hardware | x86-64 |
OS | Ubuntu |
Status | UNCONFIRMED |
Severity | Major |
Priority | Low |
Component | TShark |
Assignee | bugzilla-admin@wireshark.org |
Reporter | mtowalski@pentest.net.pl |
Created attachment 14818 [details] PoC Build Information: TShark (Wireshark) 2.3.0 (v2.3.0rc0-312-g13d0d10 from master) Copyright 1998-2016 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors. License GPLv2+: GNU GPL version 2 or later <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html> This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Compiled (64-bit) without libpcap, with GLib 2.40.2, with zlib 1.2.8, without SMI, without c-ares, without Lua, with GnuTLS 2.12.23, with Gcrypt 1.5.3, with MIT Kerberos, without GeoIP. Running on Linux 4.2.0-27-generic, with locale LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8, LC_NUMERIC=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_TIME=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_COLLATE=en_US.UTF-8, LC_MONETARY=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_MESSAGES=en_US.UTF-8, LC_PAPER=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_NAME=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_ADDRESS=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_TELEPHONE=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_MEASUREMENT=pl_PL.UTF-8, LC_IDENTIFICATION=pl_PL.UTF-8, with GnuTLS 2.12.23, with Gcrypt 1.5.3, with zlib 1.2.8. Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU 860 @ 2.80GHz (with SSE4.2) Built using clang 4.2.1 Compatible Clang 3.9.0 (trunk 274369). -- ================================================================= ==24799==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffee55f4350 at pc 0x7f16a97756b6 bp 0x7ffee55f4170 sp 0x7ffee55f4168 WRITE of size 4 at 0x7ffee55f4350 thread T0 #0 0x7f16a97756b5 in parse_outhdr_string /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-catapult-dct2000.c:1405:46 #1 0x7f16a97756b5 in dissect_catapult_dct2000 /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-catapult-dct2000.c:2205 #2 0x7f16a93162fd in call_dissector_through_handle /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:649:8 #3 0x7f16a93162fd in call_dissector_work /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:724 #4 0x7f16a9315ea1 in dissector_try_uint_new /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:1188:9 #5 0x7f16a9a97165 in dissect_frame /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:507:11 #6 0x7f16a93162fd in call_dissector_through_handle /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:649:8 #7 0x7f16a93162fd in call_dissector_work /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:724 #8 0x7f16a93138c8 in call_dissector_only /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:2780:8 #9 0x7f16a93138c8 in call_dissector_with_data /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:2793 #10 0x7f16a9312ecb in dissect_record /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/packet.c:532:3 #11 0x7f16a92f5388 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/epan.c:379:2 #12 0x55e045a73435 in process_packet /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/tshark.c:3433:5 #13 0x55e045a73435 in load_cap_file /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/tshark.c:3189 #14 0x55e045a73435 in main /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/tshark.c:1893 #15 0x7f16a0044f44 in __libc_start_main /build/eglibc-oGUzwX/eglibc-2.19/csu/libc-start.c:287 #16 0x55e04599fd15 in _start (/media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/run/tshark+0x48d15) Address 0x7ffee55f4350 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 464 in frame #0 0x7f16a976c2ff in dissect_catapult_dct2000 /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-catapult-dct2000.c:2076 This frame has 18 object(s): [32, 36) 'number_of_ues.i' [48, 128) 'ueids.i' [160, 240) 'rntis.i' [272, 276) 'rapid.i' [288, 292) 'rach_attempt_number.i' [304, 308) 'temp.i' [320, 324) 'next_offset.i' [336, 464) 'digit_array.i' <== Memory access at offset 464 overflows this variable [496, 500) 'context_length' [512, 516) 'protocol_length' [528, 532) 'timestamp_length' [544, 548) 'variant_length' [560, 564) 'outhdr_length' [576, 584) 'string' [608, 616) 'string2776' [640, 656) 'sourcev6' [672, 688) 'destv6' [704, 896) 'dotted_protocol_name' HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow /media/Fuzzing/Targets/wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-catapult-dct2000.c:1405:46 in parse_outhdr_string Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10005cab6810: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10005cab6820: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10005cab6830: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10005cab6840: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 0x10005cab6850: f2 f2 04 f2 04 f2 04 f2 04 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10005cab6860: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 04 f2 0x10005cab6870: 04 f2 04 f2 04 f2 04 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 0x10005cab6880: 00 00 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10005cab6890: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10005cab68a0: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10005cab68b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==24799==ABORTING
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