Ethereal-dev: Re: [Ethereal-dev] Re: [PATCH] SSL + DTLS
Note: This archive is from the project's previous web site, ethereal.com. This list is no longer active.
From: "authesserre samuel" <sauthess@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2006 10:44:13 +0200
Hi, enclosed find the new patch made on svn .... it make the same that I've say last mail but since I've found another error in OpenSSL implementation : DTLS implementation doesn't add two bytes long before Pre Master Secret in RSA key exchange (in ClientKeyExchange message..) I've corrected Version problem and this problem in openssl and I will send a patch tomorrow (I've done the correction in DTLS dissector too) If my corrections will be integrated I send here new patch.(If I have enougth time I would like to implement that's missing in DTLS implementation like replay or packet loss handling) My problem is integration in wireshark because a lot of things in DTLS and SSL dissectors are same and I don't know how to make the code maintainable (Ive put things in packet-ssl-utils but I don't know if it is a good choice...). The DTLS dissector is a copy of SSL dissector that I adapted...but I don't know how I can do otherwise regards, Samuel On 6/14/06, Joerg Mayer <jmayer@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Mon, Jun 12, 2006 at 04:52:15PM +0200, authesserre samuel wrote:
> >It's a new patch (and certainly the last of me) for SSL and DTLS
> >decryption.
> >The SSL one isn't new, it correct some bugs .... (like alert decryption)
I tried to apply your patch to current wireshark svn, and it failed.
Can you please recreate it against the current svn sources?
Thanks
Joerg
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-- ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + Authesserre Samuel + + 12 rue de la défense passive+ + 14000 CAEN + + FRANCE + + 06-27-28-13-32 + + sauthess@xxxxxxxxx + ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
diff -Nru wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/Makefile.common wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/Makefile.common
--- wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/Makefile.common 2006-06-15 09:45:46.467206248 +0200
+++ wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/Makefile.common 2006-06-15 09:47:40.184918528 +0200
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@
packet-dop.c \
packet-dsi.c \
packet-dsp.c \
+ packet-dtls.c \
packet-dtp.c \
packet-dua.c \
packet-dvmrp.c \
diff -Nru wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-dtls.c wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-dtls.c
--- wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-dtls.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-dtls.c 2006-06-15 09:47:05.212235184 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,3871 @@
+/* packet-dtls.c
+ * Routines for dtls dissection
+ * Copyright (c) 2006, Authesserre Samuel <sauthess@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * $Id: packet-dtls.c 18004 2006-04-26 15:10:23Z jmayer $
+ *
+ * Ethereal - Network traffic analyzer
+ * By Gerald Combs <gerald@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <glib.h>
+
+#include <epan/conversation.h>
+#include <epan/prefs.h>
+#include <epan/inet_v6defs.h>
+#include <epan/dissectors/packet-x509af.h>
+#include <epan/emem.h>
+#include <epan/tap.h>
+#include "packet-ssl-utils.h"
+
+static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE;
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+
+/* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */
+static int dtls_tap = -1;
+static int proto_dtls = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_content_type = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_version = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_epoch = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_sequence_number = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_length = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_appdata = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_record_appdata_decrypted = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_record = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1;
+static int hf_pct_msg_type = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_change_cipher_spec = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_alert_message = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_alert_message_level = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_alert_message_description = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_protocol = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_type = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_length = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_message_seq = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_fragment_offset = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_fragment_length = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_client_version = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_server_version = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_random_time = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_random_bytes = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cookie = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suite = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_session_id = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_comp_methods_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_comp_methods = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_comp_method = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_extensions_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_extension_type = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_extension_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_extension_data = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_certificates_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_certificates = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_certificate = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_certificate_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cert_types_count = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cert_types = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_cert_type = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_finished = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_md5_hash = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_sha_hash = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_dnames_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_dnames = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_dname_len = -1;
+static int hf_dtls_handshake_dname = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1;
+static int hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_cert = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_server_cert = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_hash = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_cipher = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_exch = -1;
+static int hf_pct_handshake_sig = -1;
+static int hf_pct_msg_error_type = -1;
+
+/* Initialize the subtree pointers */
+static gint ett_dtls = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_record = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_alert = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_handshake = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_cipher_suites = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_comp_methods = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_extension = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_certs = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_cert_types = -1;
+static gint ett_dtls_dnames = -1;
+static gint ett_pct_cipher_suites = -1;
+static gint ett_pct_hash_suites = -1;
+static gint ett_pct_cert_suites = -1;
+static gint ett_pct_exch_suites = -1;
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned int ssl_port;
+ unsigned int decrypted_port;
+ dissector_handle_t handle;
+ char* info;
+} SslAssociation;
+
+static char* dtls_keys_list = NULL;
+static char* dtls_ports_list = NULL;
+static char* dtls_debug_file_name = NULL;
+
+typedef struct _SslService {
+ address addr;
+ guint port;
+} SslService;
+
+static GHashTable *ssl_session_hash = NULL;
+static GHashTable *ssl_key_hash = NULL;
+static GTree* ssl_associations = NULL;
+static dissector_handle_t dtls_handle = NULL;
+static StringInfo ssl_decrypted_data = {NULL, 0};
+static int ssl_decrypted_data_avail = 0;
+
+/* Hash Functions for ssl sessions table and private keys table*/
+static gint
+ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
+{
+ const StringInfo *val1 = (const StringInfo *)v;
+ const StringInfo *val2 = (const StringInfo *)v2;
+
+ if (val1->data_len == val2->data_len &&
+ !memcmp(val1->data, val2->data, val2->data_len)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static guint
+ssl_hash (gconstpointer v)
+{
+ guint l,hash = 0;
+ StringInfo* id = (StringInfo*) v;
+ guint* cur = (guint*) id->data;
+ for (l=4; (l<id->data_len); l+=4, cur++)
+ hash = hash ^ (*cur);
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_private_key_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
+{
+ const SslService *val1 = (const SslService *)v;
+ const SslService *val2 = (const SslService *)v2;
+
+ if ((val1->port == val2->port) &&
+ ! CMP_ADDRESS(&val1->addr, &val2->addr)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static guint
+ssl_private_key_hash (gconstpointer v)
+{
+ const SslService *key = (const SslService *)v;
+ guint l,hash = key->port, len = key->addr.len;
+
+ guint* cur = (guint*) key->addr.data;
+ for (l=4; (l<len); l+=4, cur++)
+ hash = hash ^ (*cur);
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+/* private key table entries have a scope 'larger' then packet capture,
+ * so we can't relay on se_alloc** function */
+static void
+ssl_private_key_free(gpointer id, gpointer key, gpointer dummy _U_)
+{
+ g_free(id);
+ ssl_free_key((SSL_PRIVATE_KEY*) key);
+}
+
+/* handling of association between ssl ports and clear text protocol */
+static void
+ssl_association_add(unsigned int port, unsigned int ctport,
+ const char* info)
+{
+ dissector_table_t udp_dissectors = find_dissector_table( "udp.port");
+ SslAssociation* assoc = g_malloc(sizeof(SslAssociation)+strlen(info)+1);
+
+ assoc->info = (char*) assoc+sizeof(SslAssociation);
+ strcpy(assoc->info, info);
+ assoc->ssl_port = port;
+ assoc->decrypted_port = ctport;
+ assoc->handle = dissector_get_port_handle(udp_dissectors, ctport);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_add port %d ctport %d info %s handle %p\n",
+ port, ctport, info, assoc->handle);
+
+ dissector_add("udp.port", port, dtls_handle);
+ g_tree_insert(ssl_associations, (gpointer)port, assoc);
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_association_cmp(gconstpointer a, gconstpointer b)
+{
+ return (gint)a-(gint)b;
+}
+
+static inline
+SslAssociation* ssl_association_find(unsigned int port)
+{
+ register SslAssociation* ret = g_tree_lookup(ssl_associations, (gpointer)port);
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_find: port %d found %p\n", port, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_association_remove_handle (gpointer key _U_,
+ gpointer data, gpointer user_data _U_)
+{
+ SslAssociation* assoc = (SslAssociation*) data;
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_remove_handle removing ptr %p handle %p\n",
+ data, assoc->handle);
+ if (assoc->handle)
+ dissector_delete("tcp.port", assoc->ssl_port, assoc->handle);
+ g_free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int
+ssl_packet_from_server(unsigned int port)
+{
+ register int ret = ssl_association_find(port) != 0;
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_packet_from_server: is from server %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* add to packet data a newly allocated tvb with the specified real data*/
+static void
+ssl_add_record_info(packet_info *pinfo, unsigned char* data, int data_len, int record_id)
+{
+ unsigned char* real_data = se_alloc(data_len);
+ SslRecordInfo* rec = se_alloc(sizeof(SslRecordInfo));
+ SslPacketInfo* pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls);
+ if (!pi)
+ {
+ pi = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslPacketInfo));
+ p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls,pi);
+ }
+
+ rec->id = record_id;
+ rec->tvb = tvb_new_real_data(real_data, data_len, data_len);
+ memcpy(real_data, data, data_len);
+
+ /* head insertion */
+ rec->next= pi->handshake_data;
+ pi->handshake_data = rec;
+}
+
+/* search in packet data the tvbuff associated to the specified id */
+static tvbuff_t*
+ssl_get_record_info(packet_info *pinfo, int record_id)
+{
+ SslRecordInfo* rec;
+ SslPacketInfo* pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls);
+ if (!pi)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (rec = pi->handshake_data; rec; rec = rec->next)
+ if (rec->id == record_id)
+ return rec->tvb;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache) */
+static void
+ssl_init(void)
+{
+ if (ssl_session_hash)
+ g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_session_hash);
+ ssl_session_hash = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ if (ssl_decrypted_data.data)
+ g_free(ssl_decrypted_data.data);
+ ssl_decrypted_data.data = g_malloc0(32);
+ ssl_decrypted_data.data_len = 32;
+}
+
+/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
+static void
+ssl_parse(void)
+{
+ if (ssl_key_hash)
+ {
+ g_hash_table_foreach(ssl_key_hash, ssl_private_key_free, NULL);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_key_hash);
+ }
+ if (ssl_associations)
+ {
+ g_tree_traverse(ssl_associations, ssl_association_remove_handle, G_IN_ORDER, NULL);
+ g_tree_destroy(ssl_associations);
+ }
+
+ /* parse private keys string, load available keys and put them in key hash*/
+ ssl_key_hash = g_hash_table_new(ssl_private_key_hash,ssl_private_key_equal);
+ ssl_associations = g_tree_new(ssl_association_cmp);
+
+ if (dtls_keys_list && (dtls_keys_list[0] != 0))
+ {
+ char* end;
+ char* start = strdup(dtls_keys_list);
+ char* tmp = start;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init keys string %s\n", start);
+ do {
+ char* addr, *port, *filename;
+ unsigned char* ip;
+ SslService* service;
+ SSL_PRIVATE_KEY * private_key;
+ FILE* fp;
+
+ addr = start;
+ /* split ip/file couple with ',' separator*/
+ end = strchr(start, ',');
+ if (end) {
+ *end = 0;
+ start = end+1;
+ }
+
+ /* for each entry split ip, port, filename with ':' separator */
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init found host entry %s\n", addr);
+ port = strchr(addr, ':');
+ if (!port)
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init entry malformed can't find port in %s\n", addr);
+ break;
+ }
+ *port = 0;
+ port++;
+
+ filename = strchr(port,':');
+ if (!filename)
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init entry malformed can't find filename in %s\n", port);
+ break;
+ }
+ *filename=0;
+ filename++;
+
+ /* convert ip and port string to network rappresentation*/
+ service = g_malloc(sizeof(SslService) + 4);
+ service->addr.type = AT_IPv4;
+ service->addr.len = 4;
+ service->addr.data = ip = ((unsigned char*)service) + sizeof(SslService);
+ sscanf(addr, "%hhu.%hhu.%hhu.%hhu", &ip[0], &ip[1], &ip[2], &ip[3]);
+ service->port = atoi(port);
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init addr %hhu.%hhu.%hhu.%hhu port %d filename %s\n",
+ ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3], service->port, filename);
+
+ /* try to load pen file*/
+ fp = fopen(filename, "rb");
+ if (!fp) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "can't open file %s \n",filename);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ private_key = ssl_load_key(fp);
+ if (!private_key) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"can't load private key from %s\n",
+ filename);
+ break;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init private key file %s successfully loaded\n",
+ filename);
+ g_hash_table_insert(ssl_key_hash, service, private_key);
+
+ } while (end != NULL);
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+
+ /* parse ssl ports string and add ssl dissector to specifed port[s]*/
+ if (dtls_ports_list && (dtls_ports_list[0] != 0))
+ {
+ char* end;
+ char* start = strdup(dtls_ports_list);
+ char* tmp = start;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init ports string %s\n", start);
+ do {
+ char* port, *ctport, *info;
+ unsigned int portn, ctportn;
+
+ port = start;
+ /* split ip/file couple with ',' separator*/
+ end = strchr(start, ',');
+ if (end) {
+ *end = 0;
+ start = end+1;
+ }
+
+ /* for each entry split ip, port, filename with ':' separator */
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init found port entry %s\n", port);
+ ctport = strchr(port, ':');
+ if (!ctport)
+ break;
+ *ctport = 0;
+ ctport++;
+
+ info = strchr(ctport,':');
+ if (!info)
+ break;
+ *info=0;
+ info++;
+
+ /* add dissector to this port */
+ portn = atoi(port);
+ ctportn = atoi(ctport);
+ if (!portn || !ctportn)
+ break;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init adding dissector to port %d (ct port %d)\n", portn, ctportn);
+ ssl_association_add(portn, ctportn, info);
+ } while (end != NULL);
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+
+ ssl_set_debug(dtls_debug_file_name);
+
+ /* [re] add ssl dissection to defaults ports */
+ ssl_association_add(4433, 80, "OpenSSL Implementation");
+}
+
+/* store master secret into session data cache */
+static void
+ssl_save_session(SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+ /* allocate stringinfo chunks for session id and master secret data*/
+ StringInfo* session_id = se_alloc0(sizeof(StringInfo) + ssl->session_id.data_len);
+ StringInfo* master_secret = se_alloc0(48 + sizeof(StringInfo));
+
+ master_secret->data = ((unsigned char*)master_secret+sizeof(StringInfo));
+ session_id->data = ((unsigned char*)session_id+sizeof(StringInfo));
+
+ ssl_data_set(session_id, ssl->session_id.data, ssl->session_id.data_len);
+ ssl_data_set(master_secret, ssl->master_secret.data, ssl->master_secret.data_len);
+ g_hash_table_insert(ssl_session_hash, session_id, master_secret);
+ ssl_print_string("ssl_save_session stored session id", session_id);
+ ssl_print_string("ssl_save_session stored master secret", master_secret);
+}
+
+static void
+ssl_restore_session(SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+ StringInfo* ms = g_hash_table_lookup(ssl_session_hash, &ssl->session_id);
+ if (!ms) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_restore_session can't find stored session\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
+ ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_restore_session master key retrived\n");
+}
+
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Forward Declarations
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors
+ *
+ */
+/* record layer dissector */
+static int dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint *conv_version,
+ gboolean *need_desegmentation,
+ SslDecryptSession *conv_data);
+
+/* change cipher spec dissector */
+static void dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset,
+ guint *conv_version, guint8 content_type);
+
+/* alert message dissector */
+static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint *conv_version);
+
+/* handshake protocol dissector */
+static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length,
+ guint *conv_version,
+ SslDecryptSession *conv_data, guint8 content_type);
+
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 length,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl);
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_verify_request(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 length,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl);
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 length,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl);
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset);
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset,
+ guint* conv_version);
+
+
+/*
+ * SSL version 2 dissectors
+ *
+ */
+
+/* record layer dissector */
+static int dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint *conv_version,
+ gboolean *need_desegmentation,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl);
+
+/* client hello dissector */
+static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl);
+
+static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset);
+
+/* client master key dissector */
+static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset);
+static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset);
+
+/* server hello dissector */
+static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
+static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
+
+
+static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset);
+
+static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset);
+
+/*
+ * Support Functions
+ *
+ */
+/*static void ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version);*/
+static int ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type);
+static int ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type);
+static int ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version);
+static int ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
+ guint8 next_byte);
+static int ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
+static int ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
+static int ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
+static int ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length);
+static int ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length);
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Main dissector
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+/*
+ * Code to actually dissect the packets
+ */
+static void
+dissect_dtls(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
+{
+
+ conversation_t *conversation;
+ void *conv_data;
+ proto_item *ti = NULL;
+ proto_tree *dtls_tree = NULL;
+ guint32 offset = 0;
+ gboolean first_record_in_frame = TRUE;
+ gboolean need_desegmentation;
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl_session = NULL;
+ guint* conv_version;
+
+ /* Track the version using conversations to reduce the
+ * chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or
+ * v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows
+ * us to more frequently set the protocol column properly
+ * for continuation data frames.
+ *
+ * Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy,
+ * so that we don't have to search the conversation
+ * table every time we want the version; when setting
+ * the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation
+ * in addition to conv_version
+ */
+ conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
+ pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
+ if (!conversation)
+ {
+ /* create a new conversation */
+ conversation = conversation_new(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
+ pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
+ }
+ conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_dtls);
+
+ /* PAOLO: manage ssl decryption data */
+ /*get a valid ssl session pointer*/
+ if (conv_data != NULL)
+ ssl_session = conv_data;
+ else {
+ SslService dummy;
+
+ ssl_session = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslDecryptSession));
+ ssl_session_init(ssl_session);
+ ssl_session->version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
+ conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_dtls, ssl_session);
+
+ /* we need to know witch side of conversation is speaking*/
+ if (ssl_packet_from_server(pinfo->srcport)) {
+ dummy.addr = pinfo->src;
+ dummy.port = pinfo->srcport;
+ }
+ else {
+ dummy.addr = pinfo->dst;
+ dummy.port = pinfo->destport;
+ }
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl server %hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd:%d\n",
+ dummy.addr.data[0],
+ dummy.addr.data[1],dummy.addr.data[2],
+ dummy.addr.data[3],dummy.port);
+
+ /* try to retrive private key for this service. Do it now 'cause pinfo
+ * is not always available
+ * Note that with HAVE_LIBGNUTLS undefined private_key is allways 0
+ * and thus decryption never engaged*/
+ ssl_session->private_key = g_hash_table_lookup(ssl_key_hash, &dummy);
+ if (!ssl_session->private_key)
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl can't find private key for this server!\n");
+ }
+ conv_version= & ssl_session->version;
+
+ /* try decryption only the first time we see this packet
+ * (to keep cipher syncronized)and only if we have
+ * the server private key*/
+ if (!ssl_session->private_key || pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
+ ssl_session = NULL;
+
+ /* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we
+ * figure out what flavor of SSL it is (assuming we don't
+ * throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "DTLS");
+ }
+
+ /* clear the the info column */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
+
+ /* TCP packets and SSL records are orthogonal.
+ * A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl
+ * record may be spread across multiple tcp packets.
+ *
+ * This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single
+ * frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp
+ * packets.
+ *
+ * Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets
+ * may be possible using ethereal conversations, but
+ * probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream
+ * reassembly.
+ */
+
+ /* Create display subtree for SSL as a whole */
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_dtls, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE);
+ dtls_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls);
+ }
+
+ /* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */
+ while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) != 0)
+ {
+ /* on second and subsequent records per frame
+ * add a delimiter on info column
+ */
+ if (!first_record_in_frame
+ && check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ {
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation.
+ */
+ need_desegmentation = FALSE;
+
+ /* first try to dispatch off the cached version
+ * known to be associated with the conversation
+ */
+ switch(*conv_version) {
+ case SSL_VER_SSLv2:
+ case SSL_VER_PCT:
+ offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, dtls_tree,
+ offset, conv_version,
+ &need_desegmentation,
+ ssl_session);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
+ case SSL_VER_TLS:
+ case SSL_VER_DTLS:
+ /* the version tracking code works too well ;-)
+ * at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after
+ * we already know the version of the connection;
+ * work around that here by detecting and calling
+ * the v2 dissector instead
+ */
+ if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset))
+ {
+ offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, dtls_tree,
+ offset, conv_version,
+ &need_desegmentation,
+ ssl_session);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, dtls_tree,
+ offset, conv_version,
+ &need_desegmentation,
+ ssl_session);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /* that failed, so apply some heuristics based
+ * on this individual packet
+ */
+ default:
+ if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset))
+ {
+ /* looks like sslv2 or pct client hello */
+ offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, dtls_tree,
+ offset, conv_version,
+ &need_desegmentation,
+ ssl_session);
+ }
+ else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset))
+ {
+ /* looks like sslv3 or tls */
+ offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, dtls_tree,
+ offset, conv_version,
+ &need_desegmentation,
+ ssl_session);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* looks like something unknown, so lump into
+ * continuation data
+ */
+ offset = tvb_length(tvb);
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ "Continuation Data");
+
+ /* Set the protocol column */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Desegmentation return check */
+ if (need_desegmentation)
+ return;
+ /* set up for next record in frame, if any */
+ first_record_in_frame = FALSE;
+ }
+ tap_queue_packet(dtls_tap, pinfo, (gpointer)proto_dtls);
+}
+
+static int
+decrypt_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length, guint8 content_type, SslDecryptSession* ssl,
+ gboolean save_plaintext)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int direction;
+ SslDecoder* decoder;
+
+ /* if we can decrypt and decryption have success
+ * add decrypted data to this packet info*/
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: app_data len %d ssl state %X\n",
+ record_length, ssl->state);
+ if (!(ssl->state & SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no session key\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* retrive decoder for this packet direction*/
+ if ((direction = ssl_packet_from_server(pinfo->srcport)) != 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using server decoder\n");
+ decoder = &ssl->server;
+ }
+ else {
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using client decoder\n");
+ decoder = &ssl->client;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure we have enough storage space for decrypted data */
+ if (record_length > ssl_decrypted_data.data_len)
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: allocating %d bytes"
+ " for decrypt data (old len %d)\n",
+ record_length + 32, ssl_decrypted_data.data_len);
+ ssl_decrypted_data.data = g_realloc(ssl_decrypted_data.data,
+ record_length + 32);
+ ssl_decrypted_data.data_len = record_length + 32;
+ }
+
+ /* run decryption and add decrypted payload to protocol data, if decryption
+ * is successful*/
+ ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len;
+ if (ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, decoder,
+ content_type, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length),
+ record_length, ssl_decrypted_data.data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ if (ret && save_plaintext)
+ {
+ SslPacketInfo* pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls);
+ if (!pi)
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: allocating app_data %d "
+ "bytes for app data\n", ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+ /* first app data record: allocate and put packet data*/
+ pi = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslPacketInfo));
+ pi->app_data.data = se_alloc(ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+ pi->app_data.data_len = ssl_decrypted_data_avail;
+ memcpy(pi->app_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+ }
+ else {
+ unsigned char* store;
+ /* update previus record*/
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: reallocating app_data "
+ "%d bytes for app data (total %d appdata bytes)\n",
+ ssl_decrypted_data_avail, pi->app_data.data_len + ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+ store = se_alloc(pi->app_data.data_len + ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+ memcpy(store, pi->app_data.data, pi->app_data.data_len);
+ memcpy(&store[pi->app_data.data_len], ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+ pi->app_data.data_len += (ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
+
+ /* old decrypted data ptr here appare to be leaked, but it's
+ * collected by emem allocator */
+ pi->app_data.data = store;
+
+ /* data ptr is changed, so remove old one and re-add the new one*/
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: removing old app_data ptr\n");
+ p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls);
+ }
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: setting decrypted app_data ptr %p\n",pi);
+ p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls, pi);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+static int
+dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint *conv_version, gboolean *need_desegmentation,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * uint8 major, minor;
+ * } ProtocolVersion;
+ *
+ *
+ * enum {
+ * change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),
+ * application_data(23), (255)
+ * } ContentType;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ContentType type;
+ * ProtocolVersion version;
+ * uint16 epoch; // New field
+ * uint48 sequence_number; // New field
+ * uint16 length;
+ * opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
+ * } TLSPlaintext;
+ */
+ guint32 record_length;
+ guint16 version;
+ guint16 epoch;
+ gdouble sequence_number;
+ guint64 sequence_number_temp;
+
+ guint8 content_type;
+ guint8 next_byte;
+ proto_tree *ti = NULL;
+ proto_tree *dtls_record_tree = NULL;
+ guint32 available_bytes = 0;
+ SslPacketInfo* pi;
+ SslAssociation* association;
+
+ available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /*
+ * Can we do reassembly?
+ */
+ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
+ /*
+ * Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
+ */
+ if (available_bytes < 13) {
+ /*
+ * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
+ * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
+ * more bytes we need, and return.
+ */
+ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
+ pinfo->desegment_len = 13 - available_bytes;
+ *need_desegmentation = TRUE;
+ return offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the record layer fields of interest
+ */
+ content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
+ epoch = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3);
+ sequence_number = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset + 7);
+ sequence_number_temp=tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 5);
+ sequence_number_temp=sequence_number_temp<<32;
+ sequence_number+=sequence_number_temp;
+ record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 11);
+
+ if(ssl){
+ if(ssl_packet_from_server(pinfo->srcport)){
+ ssl->server.seq=sequence_number;
+ ssl->server.epoch=epoch;
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl->client.seq=sequence_number;
+ ssl->client.epoch=epoch;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) {
+
+ /*
+ * Can we do reassembly?
+ */
+ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
+ /*
+ * Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
+ */
+ if (available_bytes < record_length + 13) {
+ /*
+ * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
+ * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
+ * more bytes we need, and return.
+ */
+ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
+ pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 13) - available_bytes;
+ *need_desegmentation = TRUE;
+ return offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense
+ * continuing any further
+ */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data");
+
+ /* Set the protocol column */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
+ }
+ return offset + 13 + record_length;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If GUI, fill in record layer part of tree
+ */
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ /* add the record layer subtree header */
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, 13 + record_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_record, tvb,
+ offset, 13 + record_length, 0);
+ dtls_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_record);
+ }
+
+ if (dtls_record_tree)
+ {
+
+ /* show the one-byte content type */
+ proto_tree_add_item(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_content_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
+ offset++;
+
+ /* add the version */
+ proto_tree_add_item(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* show epoch */
+ proto_tree_add_uint(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_epoch, tvb, offset, 2, epoch);
+
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* add sequence_number */
+
+ proto_tree_add_double(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_sequence_number, tvb, offset, 6, sequence_number);
+
+ offset += 6;
+
+ /* add the length */
+ proto_tree_add_uint(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_length, tvb,
+ offset, 2, record_length);
+ offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */
+
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* if no GUI tree, then just skip over those fields */
+ offset += 13;
+ }
+
+
+
+ /*
+ * if we don't already have a version set for this conversation,
+ * but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's
+ * not client_hello, then save the version to to conversation
+ * structure and print the column version
+ */
+ next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN
+ && ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, next_byte))
+ {
+ if (version == SSLV3_VERSION)
+ {
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv3;
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl->version_netorder = version;
+ ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
+ }
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
+ else if (version == TLSV1_VERSION)
+ {
+
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_TLS;
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl->version_netorder = version;
+ ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
+ }
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
+ else if (version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
+ {
+
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1;
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl->version_netorder = version;
+ ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
+ }
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
+ else if (version == DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION)
+ {
+
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_DTLS;
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl->version_netorder = version;
+ ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
+ }
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
+ }
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ if (version == DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION)
+ {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
+ ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_DTLS]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * now dissect the next layer
+ */
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record: content_type %d\n",content_type);
+
+ /* PAOLO try to decrypt each record (we must keep ciphers "in sync")
+ * store plain text only for app data */
+
+ switch (content_type) {
+ case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Change Cipher Spec");
+ dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvb, dtls_record_tree,
+ offset, conv_version, content_type);
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ID_ALERT:
+ {
+ tvbuff_t* decrypted=0;
+ if (ssl&&decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
+ record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
+ ssl_add_record_info(pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
+ ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
+
+ /* try to retrive and use decrypted alert record, if any. */
+ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(pinfo, offset);
+ if (decrypted)
+ dissect_ssl3_alert(decrypted, pinfo, dtls_record_tree, 0,
+ conv_version);
+ else
+ dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, dtls_record_tree, offset,
+ conv_version);
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
+ {
+ tvbuff_t* decrypted=0;
+ /* try to decrypt handshake record, if possible. Store decrypted
+ * record for later usage. The offset is used as 'key' to itentify
+ * this record into the packet (we can have multiple handshake records
+ * in the same frame) */
+ if (ssl && decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
+ record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
+ ssl_add_record_info(pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
+ ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
+
+ /* try to retrive and use decrypted handshake record, if any. */
+ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(pinfo, offset);
+ if (decrypted)
+ dissect_ssl3_handshake(decrypted, pinfo, dtls_record_tree, 0,
+ decrypted->length, conv_version, ssl, content_type);
+ else
+ dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvb, pinfo, dtls_record_tree, offset,
+ record_length, conv_version, ssl, content_type);
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
+ if (ssl)
+ decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
+ record_length, content_type, ssl, TRUE);
+
+ /* show on info colum what we are decoding */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data");
+
+ if (!dtls_record_tree)
+ break;
+
+ /* we need dissector information when the selected packet is shown.
+ * ssl session pointer is NULL at that time, so we can't access
+ * info cached there*/
+ association = ssl_association_find(pinfo->srcport);
+ association = association ? association: ssl_association_find(pinfo->destport);
+
+ proto_item_set_text(dtls_record_tree,
+ "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
+ val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
+ association?association->info:"Application Data");
+
+ /* show decrypted data info, if available */
+ pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_dtls);
+ if (pi && pi->app_data.data)
+ {
+ tvbuff_t* new_tvb;
+
+ /* try to dissect decrypted data*/
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record decrypted len %d\n",
+ pi->app_data.data_len);
+
+ /* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
+ new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(pi->app_data.data,
+ pi->app_data.data_len, pi->app_data.data_len);
+ tvb_set_free_cb(new_tvb, g_free);
+ /* tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, new_tvb); */
+
+ /* find out a dissector using server port*/
+ if (association && association->handle) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found association %p\n", association);
+ ssl_print_text_data("decrypted app data",pi->app_data.data,
+ pi->app_data.data_len);
+
+ call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pinfo, dtls_record_tree);
+ }
+ /* add raw decrypted data only if a decoder is not found*/
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_string(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_appdata_decrypted, tvb,
+ offset, pi->app_data.data_len, (char*) pi->app_data.data);
+ }
+ else {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length);
+ proto_tree_add_item(dtls_record_tree, hf_dtls_record_appdata, tvb,
+ offset, record_length, 0);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* shouldn't get here since we check above for valid types */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Bad SSLv3 Content Type");
+ break;
+ }
+ offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+/* dissects the change cipher spec procotol, filling in the tree */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint* conv_version, guint8 content_type)
+{
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
+ * } ChangeCipherSpec;
+ *
+ */
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(tree,
+ "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec",
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
+ val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_change_cipher_spec, tvb,
+ offset++, 1, FALSE);
+ }
+}
+
+/* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint* conv_version)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * AlertLevel level;
+ * AlertDescription description;
+ * } Alert;
+ */
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *ssl_alert_tree = NULL;
+ const gchar *level;
+ const gchar *desc;
+ guint8 byte;
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_alert_message, tvb,
+ offset, 2, 0);
+ ssl_alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_alert);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * set the record layer label
+ */
+
+ /* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */
+ level = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_level);
+
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */
+ desc = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_description);
+
+ /* now set the text in the record layer line */
+ if (level && desc)
+ {
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ "Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)",
+ level, desc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Alert");
+ }
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ if (level && desc)
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert "
+ "(Level: %s, Description: %s)",
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
+ level, desc);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_dtls_alert_message_level,
+ tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_dtls_alert_message_description,
+ tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(tree,
+ "%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert",
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
+ proto_item_set_text(ssl_alert_tree,
+ "Alert Message: Encrypted Alert");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length, guint *conv_version,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl, guint8 content_type)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * HandshakeType msg_type;
+ * uint24 length;
+ * uint16 message_seq; //new field
+ * uint24 fragment_offset; //new field
+ * uint24 fragment_length; //new field
+ * select (HandshakeType) {
+ * case hello_request: HelloRequest;
+ * case client_hello: ClientHello;
+ * case server_hello: ServerHello;
+ * case hello_verify_request: HelloVerifyRequest; //new field
+ * case certificate: Certificate;
+ * case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange;
+ * case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
+ * case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone;
+ * case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
+ * case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange;
+ * case finished: Finished;
+ * } body;
+ * } Handshake;
+ */
+ proto_tree *ti = NULL;
+ proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree = NULL;
+ const gchar *msg_type_str = NULL;
+ guint8 msg_type;
+ guint32 length;
+ guint16 message_seq;
+ guint32 fragment_offset;
+ guint32 fragment_length;
+
+ gboolean first_iteration = TRUE;
+
+
+ /* just as there can be multiple records per packet, there
+ * can be multiple messages per record as long as they have
+ * the same content type
+ *
+ * we really only care about this for handshake messages
+ */
+
+ /* set record_length to the max offset */
+ record_length += offset;
+ while (offset < record_length)
+ {
+ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type);
+ length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1);
+ message_seq = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb,offset + 4);
+ fragment_offset = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 6);
+ fragment_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 9);
+
+ if (!msg_type_str && !first_iteration)
+ {
+ /* only dissect / report messages if they're
+ * either the first message in this record
+ * or they're a valid message type
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* on second and later iterations, add comma to info col */
+ if (!first_iteration)
+ {
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Update our info string
+ */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "%s", (msg_type_str != NULL)
+ ? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message");
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ /* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */
+ if (first_iteration)
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
+ val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
+ (msg_type_str!=NULL) ? msg_type_str :
+ "Encrypted Handshake Message");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
+ ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
+ val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
+ "Multiple Handshake Messages");
+ }
+
+ /* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_protocol, tvb,
+ offset, length + 12, 0);
+ ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_handshake);
+
+ if (ssl_hand_tree)
+ {
+ /* set the text label on the subtree node */
+ proto_item_set_text(ssl_hand_tree, "Handshake Protocol: %s",
+ (msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str :
+ "Encrypted Handshake Message");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */
+ if (!msg_type_str)
+ return;
+
+ /* PAOLO: if we are doing ssl decryption we must dissect some requests type */
+ if (ssl_hand_tree || ssl)
+ {
+ /* add nodes for the message type and message length */
+ if (ssl_hand_tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_hand_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, msg_type);
+ offset++;
+ if (ssl_hand_tree)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_length,
+ tvb, offset, 3, length);
+ offset += 3;
+
+ if (ssl_hand_tree)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_message_seq,
+ tvb, offset, 2, message_seq);
+ offset += 2;
+ if (ssl_hand_tree)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_fragment_offset,
+ tvb, offset, 3, fragment_offset);
+ offset += 3;
+ if (ssl_hand_tree)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_fragment_length,
+ tvb, offset, 3, fragment_length);
+ offset += 3;
+
+ /* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */
+ switch (msg_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ /* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_verify_request(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
+ /* unimplemented */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
+ /* server_hello_done has no fields, so nothing to do! */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
+ /* unimplemented */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
+ {
+ /* PAOLO: here we can have all the data to build session key*/
+ StringInfo encrypted_pre_master;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned encrlen = length, skip = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl)
+ break;
+
+ /* check for required session data */
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG state %X\n",
+ ssl->state);
+ if ((ssl->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) !=
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake not enough data to generate key (required %X)\n",
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ encrypted_pre_master.data = se_alloc(encrlen);
+ encrypted_pre_master.data_len = encrlen;
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, encrypted_pre_master.data, offset+skip, encrlen);
+
+ if (!ssl->private_key) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't find private key\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* go with ssl key processessing; encrypted_pre_master
+ * will be used for master secret store*/
+ ret = ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl, &encrypted_pre_master, ssl->private_key);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't decrypt pre master secret\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't generate keyring material\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
+ ssl_save_session(ssl);
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake session keys succesfully generated\n");
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree,
+ offset, conv_version);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ }
+ else{
+ offset += 12; /* skip the handshake header when handshake is not processed*/
+ }
+ offset += length;
+ first_iteration = FALSE; /* set up for next pass, if any */
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint from_server)
+{
+ /* show the client's random challenge */
+ nstime_t gmt_unix_time;
+ guint8 session_id_length = 0;
+
+ if (ssl)
+ {
+ /* PAOLO: get proper peer information*/
+ StringInfo* rnd;
+ if (from_server)
+ rnd = &ssl->server_random;
+ else
+ rnd = &ssl->client_random;
+
+ /* get provided random for keyring generation*/
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32);
+ rnd->data_len = 32;
+ if (from_server)
+ ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
+ else
+ ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common found random state %X\n",
+ ssl->state);
+
+ session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 32);
+ /* check stored session id info */
+ if (from_server && (session_id_length == ssl->session_id.data_len) &&
+ (tvb_memeql(tvb, offset+33, ssl->session_id.data, session_id_length) == 0))
+ {
+ /* clinet/server id match: try to restore a previous cached session*/
+ ssl_restore_session(ssl);
+ }
+ else {
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset+33, session_id_length);
+ ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ /* show the time */
+ gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0;
+ proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_random_time,
+ tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* show the random bytes */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_random_bytes,
+ tvb, offset, 28, 0);
+ offset += 28;
+
+ /* show the session id */
+ session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_session_id_len,
+ tvb, offset++, 1, 0);
+ if (session_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session_id_length);
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_session_id,
+ tvb, offset, session_id_length,
+ tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
+ "Session ID (%u byte%s)",
+ session_id_length,
+ plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
+ offset += session_id_length;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /* XXXX */
+ return session_id_length+33;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 left)
+{
+ guint16 extension_length;
+ guint16 ext_type;
+ guint16 ext_len;
+ proto_item *pi;
+ proto_tree *ext_tree;
+
+ if (left < 2)
+ return offset;
+
+ extension_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_extensions_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, extension_length);
+ offset += 2;
+ left -= 2;
+
+ while (left >= 4)
+ {
+ ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
+
+ pi = proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len,
+ "Extension: %s",
+ val_to_str(ext_type,
+ tls_hello_extension_types,
+ "Unknown %u"));
+ ext_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pi, ett_dtls_extension);
+ if (!ext_tree)
+ ext_tree = tree;
+
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_extension_type,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ext_type);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_extension_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ext_len);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(ext_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_extension_data,
+ tvb, offset, ext_len,
+ tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, ext_len),
+ "Data (%u byte%s)",
+ ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s"));
+ offset += ext_len;
+ left -= 2 + 2 + ext_len;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
+ SslDecryptSession*ssl)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion client_version;
+ * Random random;
+ * SessionID session_id;
+ * opaque cookie<0..32>; //new field
+ * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
+ * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
+ * Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } ClientHello;
+ *
+ */
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *cs_tree;
+ guint16 cipher_suite_length = 0;
+ guint8 compression_methods_length = 0;
+ guint8 compression_method;
+ guint16 start_offset = offset;
+ guint8 cookie_length = 0;
+
+ if (tree || ssl)
+ {
+ /* show the client version */
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_client_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* show the fields in common with server hello */
+ offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset, ssl, 0);
+
+ /* look for a cookie */
+ cookie_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
+
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len,
+ tvb, offset, 1, cookie_length);
+ offset ++; /* skip opaque length */
+
+ if (cookie_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cookie_length);
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cookie,
+ tvb, offset, cookie_length,
+ tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, cookie_length),
+ "Cookie (%u byte%s)",
+ cookie_length,
+ plurality(cookie_length, "", "s"));
+ offset += cookie_length;
+ }
+
+ /* tell the user how many cipher suites there are */
+ cipher_suite_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, cipher_suite_length);
+ offset += 2; /* skip opaque length */
+
+ if (cipher_suite_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites,
+ tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
+ "Cipher Suites (%u suite%s)",
+ cipher_suite_length / 2,
+ plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
+
+ /* make this a subtree */
+ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_cipher_suites);
+ if (!cs_tree)
+ {
+ cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
+ }
+
+ while (cipher_suite_length > 0)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suite,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+ cipher_suite_length -= 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* tell the user how man compression methods there are */
+ compression_methods_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_comp_methods_len,
+ tvb, offset, 1, compression_methods_length);
+ offset++;
+
+ if (compression_methods_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, compression_methods_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_comp_methods,
+ tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
+ "Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
+ compression_methods_length,
+ plurality(compression_methods_length,
+ "", "s"));
+
+ /* make this a subtree */
+ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_comp_methods);
+ if (!cs_tree)
+ {
+ cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
+ }
+
+ while (compression_methods_length > 0)
+ {
+ compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (compression_method < 64)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf_dtls_handshake_comp_method,
+ tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
+ else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
+ proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
+ "Compression Method: Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
+ compression_method);
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
+ "Compression Method: Private use range (%u)",
+ compression_method);
+ offset++;
+ compression_methods_length--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (length > offset - start_offset)
+ {
+ offset = dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvb, tree, offset,
+ length -
+ (offset - start_offset));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_verify_request(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 length,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion server_version;
+ * opaque cookie<0..32>;
+ * } HelloVerifyRequest;
+ */
+
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *cs_tree;
+ guint8 cookie_length = 0;
+
+ if (tree || ssl)
+ {
+ /* show the client version */
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_server_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+
+ /* look for a cookie */
+ cookie_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
+
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len,
+ tvb, offset, 1, cookie_length);
+ offset ++; /* skip opaque length */
+
+ if (cookie_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cookie_length);
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cookie,
+ tvb, offset, cookie_length,
+ tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, cookie_length),
+ "Cookie (%u byte%s)",
+ cookie_length,
+ plurality(cookie_length, "", "s"));
+ offset += cookie_length;
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length, SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion server_version;
+ * Random random;
+ * SessionID session_id;
+ * CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+ * CompressionMethod compression_method;
+ * Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } ServerHello;
+ */
+ guint16 start_offset = offset;
+
+ if (tree || ssl)
+ {
+ /* show the server version */
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_server_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* first display the elements conveniently in
+ * common with client hello
+ */
+ offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset, ssl, 1);
+
+ /* PAOLO: handle session cipher suite */
+ if (ssl) {
+ /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
+ ssl->cipher = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if (ssl_find_cipher(ssl->cipher,&ssl->cipher_suite) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello can't find cipher suite %X\n", ssl->cipher);
+ goto no_cipher;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello found cipher %X, state %X\n",
+ ssl->cipher, ssl->state);
+
+ /* if we have restored a session now we can have enought material
+ * to build session key, check it out*/
+ if ((ssl->state &
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) !=
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello not enough data to generate key (required %X)\n",
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET));
+ goto no_cipher;
+ }
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello trying to generate keys\n");
+ if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello can't generate keyring material\n");
+ goto no_cipher;
+ }
+ ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
+ }
+no_cipher:
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
+
+ /* now the server-selected cipher suite */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suite,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* and the server-selected compression method */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_comp_method,
+ tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
+ offset++;
+
+ if (length > offset - start_offset)
+ {
+ offset = dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvb, tree, offset,
+ length -
+ (offset - start_offset));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
+{
+
+ /* opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>;
+ * } Certificate;
+ */
+ guint32 certificate_list_length;
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ certificate_list_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_certificates_len,
+ tvb, offset, 3, certificate_list_length);
+ offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
+
+ if (certificate_list_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, certificate_list_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_certificates,
+ tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
+ "Certificates (%u byte%s)",
+ certificate_list_length,
+ plurality(certificate_list_length,
+ "", "s"));
+
+ /* make it a subtree */
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_certs);
+ if (!subtree)
+ {
+ subtree = tree; /* failsafe */
+ }
+
+ /* iterate through each certificate */
+ while (certificate_list_length > 0)
+ {
+ /* get the length of the current certificate */
+ guint32 cert_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
+ certificate_list_length -= 3 + cert_length;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_dtls_handshake_certificate_len,
+ tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
+ offset += 3;
+
+ dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, hf_dtls_handshake_certificate);
+ offset += cert_length;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ /*
+ * enum {
+ * rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
+ * (255)
+ * } ClientCertificateType;
+ *
+ * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ *
+ */
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ guint8 cert_types_count = 0;
+ int dnames_length = 0;
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ cert_types_count = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cert_types_count,
+ tvb, offset, 1, cert_types_count);
+ offset++;
+
+ if (cert_types_count > 0)
+ {
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_cert_types,
+ tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
+ "Certificate types (%u type%s)",
+ cert_types_count,
+ plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_cert_types);
+ if (!subtree)
+ {
+ subtree = tree;
+ }
+
+ while (cert_types_count > 0)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_dtls_handshake_cert_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
+ offset++;
+ cert_types_count--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dnames_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_dnames_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, dnames_length);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if (dnames_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, dnames_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_dnames,
+ tvb, offset, dnames_length,
+ "Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
+ dnames_length,
+ plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_dnames);
+ if (!subtree)
+ {
+ subtree = tree;
+ }
+
+ while (dnames_length > 0)
+ {
+ /* get the length of the current certificate */
+ guint16 name_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ dnames_length -= 2 + name_length;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_dtls_handshake_dname_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, name_length);
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(subtree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_dname,
+ tvb, offset, name_length,
+ tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, name_length),
+ "Distinguished Name (%u byte%s)",
+ name_length,
+ plurality(name_length, "", "s"));
+ offset += name_length;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint* conv_version)
+{
+ /* For TLS:
+ * struct {
+ * opaque verify_data[12];
+ * } Finished;
+ *
+ * For SSLv3:
+ * struct {
+ * opaque md5_hash[16];
+ * opaque sha_hash[20];
+ * } Finished;
+ */
+
+ /* this all needs a tree, so bail if we don't have one */
+ if (!tree)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch(*conv_version) {
+ case SSL_VER_DTLS:
+ case SSL_VER_TLS:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_finished,
+ tvb, offset, 12, FALSE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_md5_hash,
+ tvb, offset, 16, FALSE);
+ offset += 16;
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_sha_hash,
+ tvb, offset, 20, FALSE);
+ offset += 20;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * SSL version 2 Dissectors
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+
+
+/* record layer dissector */
+static int
+dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint* conv_version,
+ gboolean *need_desegmentation,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+ guint32 initial_offset = offset;
+ guint8 byte = 0;
+ guint8 record_length_length = 0;
+ guint32 record_length = 0;
+ gint is_escape = -1;
+ gint16 padding_length = -1;
+ guint8 msg_type = 0;
+ const gchar *msg_type_str = NULL;
+ guint32 available_bytes = 0;
+
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *dtls_record_tree = NULL;
+
+ /* pull first byte; if high bit is set, then record
+ * length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise
+ * record length is two bytes
+ */
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3;
+
+ /*
+ * Can we do reassembly?
+ */
+ available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
+ /*
+ * Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
+ */
+ if (available_bytes < record_length_length) {
+ /*
+ * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
+ * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
+ * more bytes we need, and return.
+ */
+ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
+ pinfo->desegment_len = record_length_length - available_bytes;
+ *need_desegmentation = TRUE;
+ return offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* parse out the record length */
+ switch(record_length_length) {
+ case 2: /* two-byte record length */
+ record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8;
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
+ record_length += byte;
+ break;
+ case 3: /* three-byte record length */
+ is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8;
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
+ record_length += byte;
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
+ padding_length = byte;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Can we do reassembly?
+ */
+ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
+ /*
+ * Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
+ */
+ if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) {
+ /*
+ * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
+ * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
+ * more bytes we need, and return.
+ */
+ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
+ pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length)
+ - available_bytes;
+ *need_desegmentation = TRUE;
+ return offset;
+ }
+ }
+ offset += record_length_length;
+
+ /* add the record layer subtree header */
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset,
+ record_length_length + record_length, 0);
+ dtls_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_record);
+
+ /* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */
+ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length);
+
+ /* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set
+ * this to sslv2
+ */
+ if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)
+ {
+ if (ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb,
+ (initial_offset +
+ record_length_length),
+ record_length)) {
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_PCT;
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
+ else if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8)
+ {
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv2;
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the
+ * conversation, then set a version for just this frame
+ * (e.g., on a client hello)
+ */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
+ (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2");
+ }
+
+ /* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is
+ * probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail
+ */
+ msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type,
+ (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
+ ? pct_msg_types : ssl_20_msg_types);
+ if (!msg_type_str
+ || ((*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT) &&
+ !ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
+ + record_length_length,
+ record_length))
+ || ((*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) &&
+ !ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
+ + record_length_length,
+ record_length)))
+ {
+ if (dtls_record_tree)
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(dtls_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
+ (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
+ ? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
+ "Encrypted Data");
+ }
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Data");
+ return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, msg_type_str);
+
+ if (dtls_record_tree)
+ {
+ proto_item_set_text(dtls_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
+ (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
+ ? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
+ msg_type_str);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We have a valid message type, so move foward, filling in the
+ * tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length,
+ * if present in the original packet
+ */
+ if (dtls_record_tree)
+ {
+ /* add the record length */
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_uint (dtls_record_tree,
+ hf_dtls_record_length, tvb,
+ initial_offset, record_length_length,
+ record_length);
+ }
+ if (dtls_record_tree && is_escape != -1)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_boolean(dtls_record_tree,
+ hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb,
+ initial_offset, 1, is_escape);
+ }
+ if (dtls_record_tree && padding_length != -1)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_uint(dtls_record_tree,
+ hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb,
+ initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * dissect the record data
+ */
+
+ /* jump forward to the start of the record data */
+ offset = initial_offset + record_length_length;
+
+ /* add the message type */
+ if (dtls_record_tree)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_item(dtls_record_tree,
+ (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
+ ? hf_pct_msg_type : hf_ssl2_msg_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, 0);
+ }
+ offset++; /* move past msg_type byte */
+
+ if (*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT)
+ {
+ /* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */
+ switch (msg_type) {
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset, ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+ case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY:
+ case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED:
+ case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ /* unimplemented */
+ break;
+
+ default: /* unknown */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* dissect the message */
+ switch (msg_type) {
+ case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset);
+ break;
+ case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
+ dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
+ break;
+ case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset);
+ break;
+ case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
+ dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset);
+ break;
+ case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
+ dissect_pct_msg_error(tvb, dtls_record_tree, offset);
+ break;
+
+ default: /* unknown */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length);
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ SslDecryptSession* ssl)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * uint8 msg_type;
+ * Version version;
+ * uint16 cipher_spec_length;
+ * uint16 session_id_length;
+ * uint16 challenge_length;
+ * V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length];
+ * opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length];
+ * Random challenge;
+ * } V2ClientHello;
+ *
+ * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version
+ *
+ */
+ guint16 version;
+ guint16 cipher_spec_length;
+ guint16 session_id_length;
+ guint16 challenge_length;
+
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *cs_tree=0;
+
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
+ {
+ /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (tree || ssl)
+ {
+ /* show the version */
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_record_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ /* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites,
+ tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
+ "Cipher Specs (%u specs)",
+ cipher_spec_length/3);
+
+ /* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */
+ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_cipher_suites);
+ if (!cs_tree)
+ {
+ cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */
+ while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
+ {
+ if (cs_tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
+ tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
+ offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */
+ cipher_spec_length -= 3;
+ }
+
+ /* if there's a session id, show it */
+ if (session_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ if (tree)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session_id_length);
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_session_id,
+ tvb, offset, session_id_length,
+ tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
+ "Session ID (%u byte%s)",
+ session_id_length,
+ plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
+ }
+
+ /* PAOLO: get session id and reset session state for key [re]negotiation */
+ if (ssl)
+ {
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset, session_id_length);
+ ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length;
+ ssl->state &= ~(SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY|SSL_MASTER_SECRET|
+ SSL_CIPHER|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM);
+ }
+ offset += session_id_length;
+ }
+
+ /* if there's a challenge, show it */
+ if (challenge_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, challenge_length);
+
+ if (tree)
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
+ tvb, offset, challenge_length, 0);
+ if (ssl)
+ {
+ /* PAOLO: get client random data; we get at most 32 bytes from
+ challenge */
+ int max = challenge_length > 32? 32: challenge_length;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("client random len: %d padded to 32\n",
+ challenge_length);
+
+ /* client random is padded with zero and 'right' aligned */
+ memset(ssl->client_random.data, 0, 32 - max);
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, &ssl->client_random.data[32 - max], offset, max);
+ ssl->client_random.data_len = 32;
+ ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
+
+ }
+ offset += challenge_length;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint16 CH_CLIENT_VERSION, CH_OFFSET, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
+ proto_item *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, *CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, *CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti;
+ proto_tree *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, *CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, *CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree;
+ gint i;
+
+ CH_CLIENT_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if(CH_CLIENT_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Client Session ID Data (32 bytes)");
+ offset += 32;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Challange Data(32 bytes)");
+ offset += 32;
+
+ CH_OFFSET = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if(CH_OFFSET != PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1)
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d, should be %d in PCT version 1", CH_OFFSET, PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1);
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d", CH_OFFSET);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CIPHER_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "HASH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CERT_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "EXCH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
+ CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cipher_suites);
+
+ for(i=0; i<(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH/4); i++) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
+ offset += 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ CH_HASH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
+ CH_HASH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_hash_suites);
+
+ for(i=0; i<(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ CH_CERT_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
+ CH_CERT_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cert_suites);
+
+ for(i=0; i< (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
+ CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_exch_suites);
+
+ for(i=0; i<(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+ offset += CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
+{
+/* structure:
+char SH_MSG_SERVER_HELLO
+char SH_PAD
+char SH_SERVER_VERSION_MSB
+char SH_SERVER_VERSION_LSB
+char SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK
+char SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ
+char SH_CIPHER_SPECS_DATA[4]
+char SH_HASH_SPECS_DATA[2]
+char SH_CERT_SPECS_DATA[2]
+char SH_EXCH_SPECS_DATA[2]
+char SH_CONNECTION_ID_DATA[32]
+char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_MSB
+char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_LSB
+char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
+char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
+char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
+char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
+char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_MSB
+char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_LSB
+char SH_CERTIFICATE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
+char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
+char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
+char SH_RESPONSE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
+
+*/
+
+ guint16 SH_SERVER_VERSION, SH_CERT_LENGTH, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
+ offset += 1;
+
+ SH_SERVER_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if(SH_SERVER_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK flag");
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ flag");
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Connection ID Data (32 bytes)");
+ offset += 32;
+
+ SH_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Certificate Length: %d", SH_CERT_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client CERT_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client SIG_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if(SH_CERT_LENGTH) {
+ dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, hf_pct_handshake_server_cert);
+ offset += SH_CERT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if(SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, "Client CERT_SPECS (%d bytes)", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
+ offset += SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if(SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, "Client Signature (%d bytes)", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
+ offset += SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if(SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ offset += SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint16 CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_sig, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Clear Key Length: %d",CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Encrypted Key Length: %d",CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH= tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d",CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Verify Prelude Length: %d",CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Cert Length: %d",CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d",CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if(CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, "Clear Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
+ offset += CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if(CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, "Encrypted Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
+ offset += CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if(CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+ offset += CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if(CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, "Verify Prelude data (%d bytes)", CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
+ offset += CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE;
+ }
+ if(CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, "Client Certificate data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
+ offset += CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if(CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Response data (%d bytes)", CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ offset += CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint16 SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Server Session ID data (32 bytes)");
+ offset += 32;
+
+ SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Response Length: %d", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if(SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
+ offset += SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint16 ERROR_CODE, INFO_LEN;
+
+ ERROR_CODE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_msg_error_type, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ INFO_LEN = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Eror Information Length: %d", INFO_LEN);
+ offset += 2;
+ if (ERROR_CODE == PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH && INFO_LEN == 6)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CIPHER");
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_HASH");
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CERT");
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_EXCH");
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_CERT");
+ offset += 1;
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_SIG");
+ offset += 1;
+ }
+ else if(INFO_LEN) {
+ proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, INFO_LEN, "Error Information dta (%d bytes)", INFO_LEN);
+ offset += INFO_LEN;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * uint8 msg_type;
+ * V2Cipherspec cipher;
+ * uint16 clear_key_length;
+ * uint16 encrypted_key_length;
+ * uint16 key_arg_length;
+ * opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length];
+ * opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length];
+ * opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length];
+ * } V2ClientMasterKey;
+ *
+ * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher
+ */
+ guint16 clear_key_length;
+ guint16 encrypted_key_length;
+ guint16 key_arg_length;
+
+ /* at this point, everything we do involves the tree,
+ * so quit now if we don't have one ;-)
+ */
+ if (!tree)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* show the selected cipher */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
+ tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
+ offset += 3;
+
+ /* get the fixed fields */
+ clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* show the variable length fields */
+ if (clear_key_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, clear_key_length);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
+ tvb, offset, clear_key_length, FALSE);
+ offset += clear_key_length;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypted_key_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
+ tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, FALSE);
+ offset += encrypted_key_length;
+ }
+
+ if (key_arg_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, key_arg_length);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
+ tvb, offset, key_arg_length, FALSE);
+ offset += key_arg_length;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * uint8 msg_type;
+ * uint8 session_id_hit;
+ * uint8 certificate_type;
+ * uint16 server_version;
+ * uint16 certificate_length;
+ * uint16 cipher_specs_length;
+ * uint16 connection_id_length;
+ * opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length];
+ * opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length];
+ * opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length];
+ * } V2ServerHello;
+ *
+ * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit
+ */
+ guint16 certificate_length;
+ guint16 cipher_spec_length;
+ guint16 connection_id_length;
+ guint16 version;
+ proto_tree *ti;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+
+ /* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so
+ * quit now if we don't have one
+ */
+ if (!tree)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
+ if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
+ {
+ /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
+ return;
+ }
+
+
+ /* is there a hit? */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
+ tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
+ offset++;
+
+ /* what type of certificate is this? */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
+ offset++;
+
+ /* now the server version */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_server_version,
+ tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* get the fixed fields */
+ certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dtls_handshake_certificate_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* now the variable length fields */
+ if (certificate_length > 0)
+ {
+ dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, hf_dtls_handshake_certificate);
+ offset += certificate_length;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_spec_length > 0)
+ {
+ /* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length);
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites,
+ tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
+ "Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)",
+ cipher_spec_length/3,
+ plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s"));
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_dtls_cipher_suites);
+ if (!subtree)
+ {
+ subtree = tree;
+ }
+
+ /* iterate through the cipher specs */
+ while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
+ tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
+ offset += 3;
+ cipher_spec_length -= 3;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (connection_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, connection_id_length);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
+ tvb, offset, connection_id_length, FALSE);
+ offset += connection_id_length;
+ }
+
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Support Functions
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+#if 0
+static void
+ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version)
+{
+ conversation_t *conversation;
+
+ if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
+ {
+ /* We've already processed this frame; no need to do any more
+ * work on it.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
+ pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
+
+ if (conversation == NULL)
+ {
+ /* create a new conversation */
+ conversation = conversation_new(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
+ pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_dtls) != NULL)
+ {
+ /* get rid of the current data */
+ conversation_delete_proto_data(conversation, proto_dtls);
+ }
+ conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_dtls, GINT_TO_POINTER(version));
+}
+#endif
+
+static int
+ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type)
+{
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
+ case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type)
+{
+ if (type >= 0x14 && type <= 0x17)
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version)
+{
+ const gchar *version_str = match_strval(version, ssl_versions);
+ return version_str != NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
+ guint8 next_byte)
+{
+ if (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE
+ && ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(next_byte))
+ {
+ return (next_byte != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ }
+ else if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)
+ && content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint8 byte;
+
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2);
+ if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
+ * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
+ * valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible,
+ * but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway.
+ */
+static int
+ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
+{
+ /* here's the current approach:
+ *
+ * we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can
+ * assume that there is not padding. This means that the
+ * first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2
+ * msg_type in the third byte
+ */
+
+ /* get the first byte; must have high bit set */
+ guint8 byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (byte < 0x80)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about
+ * unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for
+ * encrypted messages), we just check against that list
+ */
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
+ switch(byte) {
+ case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
+ * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
+ * valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable
+ * than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol
+ */
+static int
+ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
+{
+ /* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid
+ * protocol version
+ */
+ guint8 byte;
+ guint16 version;
+
+ /* see if the first byte is a valid content type */
+ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
+ if (version != DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
+ * or not the data beginning at offset looks
+ * like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
+ * since it isn't possible to completely tell random
+ * data apart from a valid message without state,
+ * we try to help the odds.
+ */
+static int
+ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length)
+{
+ /* first byte should be a msg_type.
+ *
+ * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
+ * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
+ * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
+ * chance of saying yes with random payload)
+ *
+ * - for those three types that we know about, do some
+ * further validation to reduce the chance of an error
+ */
+ guint8 msg_type;
+ guint16 version;
+ guint32 sum;
+
+ /* fetch the msg_type */
+ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+
+ switch (msg_type) {
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
+ return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ /* version is three bytes after msg_type */
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3);
+ return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ /* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length
+ * must be less than record length
+ */
+ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */
+ if (sum > record_length)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
+ * or not the data beginning at offset looks
+ * like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
+ * since it isn't possible to completely tell random
+ * data apart from a valid message without state,
+ * we try to help the odds.
+ */
+static int
+ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 record_length)
+{
+ /* first byte should be a msg_type.
+ *
+ * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
+ * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
+ * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
+ * chance of saying yes with random payload)
+ *
+ * - for those three types that we know about, do some
+ * further validation to reduce the chance of an error
+ */
+ guint8 msg_type;
+ guint16 version;
+ guint32 sum;
+
+ /* fetch the msg_type */
+ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+
+ switch (msg_type) {
+ case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
+ return version == PCT_VERSION_1;
+ break;
+
+ case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
+ /* version is one byte after msg_type */
+ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2);
+ return version == PCT_VERSION_1;
+ break;
+
+ case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ /* sum of various length fields must be less than record length */
+ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* clear_key_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* encrypted_key_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 10); /* key_arg_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 12); /* verify_prelude_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 14); /* client_cert_length */
+ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 16); /* response_length */
+ if (sum > record_length)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ break;
+
+ case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
+ /* record is 36 bytes longer than response_length */
+ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 34); /* response_length */
+ if ((sum + 36) == record_length)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Standard Ethereal Protocol Registration and housekeeping
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
+void
+proto_register_dtls(void)
+{
+
+ /* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/
+ static hf_register_info hf[] = {
+ { &hf_dtls_record,
+ { "Record Layer", "dtls.record",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Record layer", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_content_type,
+ { "Content Type", "dtls.record.content_type",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0,
+ "Content type", HFILL}
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_version,
+ { "Version", "dtls.record.version",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
+ "Record layer version.", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_epoch,
+ { "Epoch", "dtls.record.epoch",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Epoch", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_sequence_number,
+ { "Sequence Number", "dtls.record.sequence_number",
+ FT_DOUBLE, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Sequence Number", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_length,
+ { "Length", "dtls.record.length",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of DTLS record data", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_appdata,
+ { "Application Data", "dtls.app_data",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Payload is application data", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_record_appdata_decrypted,
+ { "Application Data decrypted", "dtls.app_data_decrypted",
+ FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Payload is decrypted application data", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_change_cipher_spec,
+ { "Change Cipher Spec Message", "dtls.change_cipher_spec",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Signals a change in cipher specifications", HFILL }
+ },
+ { & hf_dtls_alert_message,
+ { "Alert Message", "dtls.alert_message",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Alert message", HFILL }
+ },
+ { & hf_dtls_alert_message_level,
+ { "Level", "dtls.alert_message.level",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0,
+ "Alert message level", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_alert_message_description,
+ { "Description", "dtls.alert_message.desc",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0,
+ "Alert message description", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_protocol,
+ { "Handshake Protocol", "dtls.handshake",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Handshake protocol message", HFILL}
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_type,
+ { "Handshake Type", "dtls.handshake.type",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0,
+ "Type of handshake message", HFILL}
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_length,
+ { "Length", "dtls.handshake.length",
+ FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of handshake message", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_message_seq,
+ { "Message Sequence", "dtls.handshake.message_seq",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Message sequence of handshake message", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_fragment_offset,
+ { "Fragment Offset", "dtls.handshake.fragment_offset",
+ FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Fragment offset of handshake message", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_fragment_length,
+ { "Fragment Length", "dtls.handshake.fragment_length",
+ FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Fragment length of handshake message", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_client_version,
+ { "Version", "dtls.handshake.version",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
+ "Maximum version supported by client", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_server_version,
+ { "Version", "dtls.handshake.version",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
+ "Version selected by server", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_random_time,
+ { "Random.gmt_unix_time", "dtls.handshake.random_time",
+ FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Unix time field of random structure", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_random_bytes,
+ { "Random.bytes", "dtls.handshake.random",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Random challenge used to authenticate server", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
+ { "Cipher Suites Length", "dtls.handshake.cipher_suites_length",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of cipher suites field", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suites,
+ { "Cipher Suites", "dtls.handshake.ciphersuites",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "List of cipher suites supported by client", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cipher_suite,
+ { "Cipher Suite", "dtls.handshake.ciphersuite",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_31_ciphersuite), 0x0,
+ "Cipher suite", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len,
+ { "Cookie Length", "dtls.handshake.cookie_length",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of the cookie field", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cookie,
+ { "Cookie", "dtls.handshake.cookie",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Cookie", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_session_id,
+ { "Session ID", "dtls.handshake.session_id",
+ FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Identifies the DTLS session, allowing later resumption", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_comp_methods_len,
+ { "Compression Methods Length", "dtls.handshake.comp_methods_length",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of compression methods field", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_comp_methods,
+ { "Compression Methods", "dtls.handshake.comp_methods",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "List of compression methods supported by client", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_comp_method,
+ { "Compression Method", "dtls.handshake.comp_method",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_compression_method), 0x0,
+ "Compression Method", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_extensions_len,
+ { "Extensions Length", "dtls.handshake.extensions_length",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of hello extensions", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_extension_type,
+ { "Type", "dtls.handshake.extension.type",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(tls_hello_extension_types), 0x0,
+ "Hello extension type", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_extension_len,
+ { "Length", "dtls.handshake.extension.len",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of a hello extension", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_extension_data,
+ { "Data", "dtls.handshake.extension.data",
+ FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Hello Extension data", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_certificates_len,
+ { "Certificates Length", "dtls.handshake.certificates_length",
+ FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of certificates field", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_certificates,
+ { "Certificates", "dtls.handshake.certificates",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "List of certificates", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_certificate,
+ { "Certificate", "dtls.handshake.certificate",
+ FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Certificate", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_certificate_len,
+ { "Certificate Length", "dtls.handshake.certificate_length",
+ FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of certificate", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cert_types_count,
+ { "Certificate types count", "dtls.handshake.cert_types_count",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Count of certificate types", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cert_types,
+ { "Certificate types", "dtls.handshake.cert_types",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "List of certificate types", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_cert_type,
+ { "Certificate type", "dtls.handshake.cert_type",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_client_certificate_type), 0x0,
+ "Certificate type", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_finished,
+ { "Verify Data", "dtls.handshake.verify_data",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Opaque verification data", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_md5_hash,
+ { "MD5 Hash", "dtls.handshake.md5_hash",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_sha_hash,
+ { "SHA-1 Hash", "dtls.handshake.sha_hash",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_session_id_len,
+ { "Session ID Length", "dtls.handshake.session_id_length",
+ FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of session ID field", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_dnames_len,
+ { "Distinguished Names Length", "dtls.handshake.dnames_len",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of list of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_dnames,
+ { "Distinguished Names", "dtls.handshake.dnames",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "List of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_dname_len,
+ { "Distinguished Name Length", "dtls.handshake.dname_len",
+ FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Length of distinguished name", HFILL }
+ },
+ { &hf_dtls_handshake_dname,
+ { "Distinguished Name", "dtls.handshake.dname",
+ FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
+ "Distinguished name of a CA that server trusts", HFILL }
+ },
+ };
+
+ /* Setup protocol subtree array */
+ static gint *ett[] = {
+ &ett_dtls,
+ &ett_dtls_record,
+ &ett_dtls_alert,
+ &ett_dtls_handshake,
+ &ett_dtls_cipher_suites,
+ &ett_dtls_comp_methods,
+ &ett_dtls_extension,
+ &ett_dtls_certs,
+ &ett_dtls_cert_types,
+ &ett_dtls_dnames,
+ };
+
+ /* Register the protocol name and description */
+ proto_dtls = proto_register_protocol("Datagram Transport Layer Security",
+ "DTLS", "dtls");
+
+ /* Required function calls to register the header fields and
+ * subtrees used */
+ proto_register_field_array(proto_dtls, hf, array_length(hf));
+ proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
+
+ {
+ module_t *dtls_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_dtls, ssl_parse);
+ prefs_register_string_preference(dtls_module, "keys_list", "RSA keys list",
+ "comma separated list of private RSA keys used for DTLS decryption; "
+ "each list entry must be in the form of <ip>:<port>:<key_file_name>"
+ "<key_file_name> is the local file name of the RSA private key used by the specified server\n",
+ (const char **)&dtls_keys_list);
+ prefs_register_string_preference(dtls_module, "ports_list", "DTLS ports list",
+ "comma separated list of tcp ports numbers to be dissectes as DTLS; "
+ "each list entry must be in the form of <port>:<clear-text-port>"
+ "<clear-text-port> is the port numbert associated with the protocol tunneled over DTLS for this port\n",
+ (const char **)&dtls_ports_list);
+ prefs_register_string_preference(dtls_module, "debug_file", "DTLS debug file",
+ "redirect dtls debug to file name; leave empty to disable debug, "
+ "use \"" SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR "\" to redirect output to stderr\n",
+ (const char **)&dtls_debug_file_name);
+ }
+
+ register_dissector("dtls", dissect_dtls, proto_dtls);
+
+ register_init_routine(ssl_init);
+ ssl_lib_init();
+ dtls_tap = register_tap("dtls");
+ ssl_debug_printf("proto_register_dtls: registered tap %s:%d\n",
+ "dtls", dtls_tap);
+}
+
+/* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration
+ * routine. This format is required because a script is used to find
+ * these routines and create the code that calls these routines.
+ */
+void
+proto_reg_handoff_dtls(void)
+{
+ dtls_handle = find_dissector("dtls");
+
+ /* add now dissector to default ports.*/
+ ssl_parse();
+}
diff -Nru wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c
--- wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c 2006-06-15 09:45:46.000000000 +0200
+++ wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c 2006-06-15 09:47:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
* Routines for ssl dissection
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro <scott@xxxxxxxxxx>
*
- * $Id: packet-ssl.c 18196 2006-05-21 04:49:01Z sahlberg $
+ * $Id: packet-ssl.c 17333 2006-02-17 11:56:52Z jmayer $
*
- * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
- * By Gerald Combs <gerald@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Ethereal - Network traffic analyzer
+ * By Gerald Combs <gerald@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE;
+static gboolean ssl_desegment_app_data = TRUE;
/*********************************************************************
@@ -580,498 +581,137 @@
ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_restore_session master key retrived\n");
}
+/* function that save app_data during sub protocol reassembling */
+static void
+ssl_add_app_data(SslDecryptSession* ssl, unsigned char* data, int data_len){
+ StringInfo * app=&ssl->app_data_segment;
+ if(app->data_len!=0){
+ unsigned char* tmp=g_malloc(app->data_len);
+ int tmp_len=app->data_len;
+ memcpy(tmp,app->data,app->data_len);
+ if(app->data!=NULL)
+ g_free(app->data);
+ app->data_len=0;
+ app->data=g_malloc(tmp_len+data_len);
+ app->data_len=tmp_len+data_len;
+ memcpy(app->data,tmp,tmp_len);
+ if(tmp!=NULL)
+ g_free(tmp);
+ memcpy(app->data+tmp_len, data,data_len);
+ }
+ else{
+ //it's new
+ if(app->data!=NULL)
+ g_free(app->data);
+ app->data=g_malloc(data_len);
+ app->data_len=data_len;
+ memcpy(app->data,data,data_len);
+ }
+}
-/* The TCP port to associate with by default */
-#define TCP_PORT_SSL 443
-#define TCP_PORT_SSL_LDAP 636
-#define TCP_PORT_SSL_IMAP 993
-#define TCP_PORT_SSL_POP 995
-
-/* version state tables */
-#define SSL_VER_UNKNOWN 0
-#define SSL_VER_SSLv2 1
-#define SSL_VER_SSLv3 2
-#define SSL_VER_TLS 3
-#define SSL_VER_PCT 4
-
-/* corresponds to the #defines above */
-static const gchar* ssl_version_short_names[] = {
- "SSL",
- "SSLv2",
- "SSLv3",
- "TLS",
- "PCT"
-};
-
-/* other defines */
-#define SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC 0x14
-#define SSL_ID_ALERT 0x15
-#define SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE 0x16
-#define SSL_ID_APP_DATA 0x17
-
-#define SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST 0
-#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 1
-#define SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO 2
-#define SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE 11
-#define SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG 12
-#define SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST 13
-#define SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE 14
-#define SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY 15
-#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG 16
-#define SSL_HND_FINISHED 20
-
-#define SSL2_HND_ERROR 0x00
-#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
-#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x02
-#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x03
-#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO 0x04
-#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY 0x05
-#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED 0x06
-#define SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 0x07
-#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 0x08
-
-#define PCT_VERSION_1 0x8001
-
-#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
-#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO 0x02
-#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x03
-#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY 0x04
-#define PCT_MSG_ERROR 0x05
-
-#define PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1 0xa
-
-#define PCT_CIPHER_DES 0x01
-#define PCT_CIPHER_IDEA 0x02
-#define PCT_CIPHER_RC2 0x03
-#define PCT_CIPHER_RC4 0x04
-#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_112 0x05
-#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_168 0x06
-
-#define PCT_HASH_MD5 0x0001
-#define PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64 0x0002
-#define PCT_HASH_SHA 0x0003
-#define PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80 0x0004
-#define PCT_HASH_DES_DM 0x0005
-
-#define PCT_CERT_NONE 0x00
-#define PCT_CERT_X509 0x01
-#define PCT_CERT_PKCS7 0x02
-
-#define PCT_SIG_NONE 0x0000
-#define PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5 0x0001
-#define PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA 0x0002
-#define PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA 0x0003
-
-#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1 0x01
-#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES 0x02
-#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3 0x03
-#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2 0x04
-#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4 0x05
-#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3 0x06
-#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES 0x07
-#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3 0x08
-#define PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN 0x09
-
-#define PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x01
-#define PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED 0x02
-#define PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE 0x03
-#define PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED 0x04
-#define PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED 0x05
-#define PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH 0x06
-
-/*
- * Lookup tables
- *
- */
-static const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = {
- { SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" },
- { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
- { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
- { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" },
- { SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
- { SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
- { SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" },
- { SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" },
- { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = {
- { 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" },
- { 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
- { 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
- { 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
- { 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
- { 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
- { 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
- { 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
- { 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
- { 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
- { 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
- { 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
- { 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
- { 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
- { 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
- { 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
- security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
- { 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
- { 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
- /* Microsoft's old PCT protocol. These are from Eric Rescorla's
- book "SSL and TLS" */
- { 0x8f8001, "PCT_SSL_COMPAT | PCT_VERSION_1" },
- { 0x800003, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509_CHAIN" },
- { 0x800001, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509" },
- { 0x810001, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_MD5" },
- { 0x810003, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_SHA" },
- { 0x820001, "PCT_SSL_EXCH_TYPE | PCT1_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1" },
- { 0x830004, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF | PCT1_CIPHER_RC4" },
- { 0x848040, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_128 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
- { 0x842840, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_40 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
- /* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in
- * a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte
- * tls cipher suite id
- */
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = {
- { 0x00, "N/A" },
- { 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = {
- { 20, "Change Cipher Spec" },
- { 21, "Alert" },
- { 22, "Handshake" },
- { 23, "Application Data" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_versions[] = {
- { 0x0301, "TLS 1.0" },
- { 0x0300, "SSL 3.0" },
- { 0x0002, "SSL 2.0" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-#if 0
-/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
- message. */
-static const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
- { 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-#endif
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
- { 1, "Warning" },
- { 2, "Fatal" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = {
- { 0, "Close Notify" },
- { 10, "Unexpected Message" },
- { 20, "Bad Record MAC" },
- { 21, "Decryption Failed" },
- { 22, "Record Overflow" },
- { 30, "Decompression Failure" },
- { 40, "Handshake Failure" },
- { 42, "Bad Certificate" },
- { 43, "Unsupported Certificate" },
- { 44, "Certificate Revoked" },
- { 45, "Certificate Expired" },
- { 46, "Certificate Unknown" },
- { 47, "Illegal Parameter" },
- { 48, "Unknown CA" },
- { 49, "Access Denied" },
- { 50, "Decode Error" },
- { 51, "Decrypt Error" },
- { 60, "Export Restriction" },
- { 70, "Protocol Version" },
- { 71, "Insufficient Security" },
- { 80, "Internal Error" },
- { 90, "User Canceled" },
- { 100, "No Renegotiation" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = {
- { SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" },
- { SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
- { SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
- { SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" },
- { SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" },
- { SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" },
- { SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" },
- { SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" },
- { SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" },
- { SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
- { 0, "null" },
- { 1, "ZLIB" },
- { 64, "LZS" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-#if 0
-/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
- seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
-static const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
- { 0, "RSA" },
- { 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = {
- { 0, "Anonymous" },
- { 1, "RSA" },
- { 2, "DSA" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-#endif
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
- { 1, "RSA Sign" },
- { 2, "DSS Sign" },
- { 3, "RSA Fixed DH" },
- { 4, "DSS Fixed DH" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-#if 0
-/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchange keys, as would be
- seen in a client key exchange message. */
-static const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
- { 0, "Implicit" },
- { 1, "Explicit" },
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-#endif
-
-static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
- { 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
- { 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
- { 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
- { 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
- { 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
- { 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
- { 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
- { 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
- { 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
- { 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
- { 0x0048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x0049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
- { 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
- { 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
- { 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
- { 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
- { 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
- /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
- security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
- { 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
- { 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
- { 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
- /* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */
- { 0x00, NULL }
-};
-
-static const value_string pct_msg_types[] = {
- { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
- { PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
- { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
- { PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
- { PCT_MSG_ERROR, "Error" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string pct_cipher_type[] = {
- { PCT_CIPHER_DES, "DES" },
- { PCT_CIPHER_IDEA, "IDEA" },
- { PCT_CIPHER_RC2, "RC2" },
- { PCT_CIPHER_RC4, "RC4" },
- { PCT_CIPHER_DES_112, "DES 112 bit" },
- { PCT_CIPHER_DES_168, "DES 168 bit" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string pct_hash_type[] = {
- { PCT_HASH_MD5, "MD5" },
- { PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64, "MD5_TRUNC_64"},
- { PCT_HASH_SHA, "SHA"},
- { PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80, "SHA_TRUNC_80"},
- { PCT_HASH_DES_DM, "DES_DM"},
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string pct_cert_type[] = {
- { PCT_CERT_NONE, "None" },
- { PCT_CERT_X509, "X.509" },
- { PCT_CERT_PKCS7, "PKCS #7" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-static const value_string pct_sig_type[] = {
- { PCT_SIG_NONE, "None" },
- { PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5, "MD5" },
- { PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA, "RSA SHA" },
- { PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA, "DSA SHA" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string pct_exch_type[] = {
- { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1, "RSA PKCS#1" },
- { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES, "RSA PKCS#1 Token DES" },
- { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3, "RSA PKCS#1 Token 3DES" },
- { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-2" },
- { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-4" },
- { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3, "DH PKCS#3" },
- { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES, "DH PKCS#3 Token DES" },
- { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3, "DH PKCS#3 Token 3DES" },
- { PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN, "Fortezza" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-static const value_string pct_error_code[] = {
- { PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, "PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE" },
- { PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILE" },
- { PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE, "PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE" },
- { PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED" },
- { PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED" },
- { PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH, "PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH" },
- { 0x00, NULL },
-};
-
-/* RFC 3546 */
-static const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[] = {
- { 0, "server_name" },
- { 1, "max_fragment_length" },
- { 2, "client_certificate_url" },
- { 3, "trusted_ca_keys" },
- { 4, "truncated_hmac" },
- { 5, "status_request" },
- { 35, "EAP-FAST PAC-Opaque" /* draft-cam-winget-eap-fast-00.txt */ },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
+static void
+ssl_desegment_ssl_app_data(SslDecryptSession * ssl, packet_info *pinfo){
+ SslPacketInfo* pi;
+ SslAssociation* association;
+ SslPacketInfo* pi2;
+ pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
+ if (pi && pi->app_data.data)
+ {
+ tvbuff_t* new_tvb;
+ packet_info * pp;
+ /* find out a dissector using server port*/
+ association = ssl_association_find(pinfo->srcport);
+ association = association ? association: ssl_association_find(pinfo->destport);
+ /* create a copy of packet_info */
+ pp=g_malloc(sizeof(packet_info));
+ memcpy(pp, pinfo, sizeof(packet_info));
+
+ if (association && association->handle) {
+ /* it's the first SS segmented packet */
+ if(ssl->app_data_segment.data==NULL){
+ /* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
+ new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(pi->app_data.data,
+ pi->app_data.data_len, pi->app_data.data_len);
+ tvb_set_free_cb(new_tvb, g_free);
+ /* we allow subdissector to tell us more bytes */
+ pp->can_desegment=2;
+ /* subdissector call */
+ call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pp, NULL);
+ /* if the dissector need more bytes */
+ if(pp->desegment_len>0){
+ /* we save the actual data to reuse them later */
+ ssl_add_app_data(ssl, pi->app_data.data, pi->app_data.data_len);
+ /* we remove data to forbid subdissection */
+ if(pinfo->fd)
+ {
+ p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
+ }
+ /* update of COL_INFO */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)){
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]");
+ pinfo->cinfo->writable=FALSE;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* it isn't the first SSL segmented packet */
+ /* we add actual data to reuse them later */
+ ssl_add_app_data(ssl, pi->app_data.data, pi->app_data.data_len);
+ /* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
+ new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(ssl->app_data_segment.data,
+ ssl->app_data_segment.data_len,
+ ssl->app_data_segment.data_len);
+ tvb_set_free_cb(new_tvb, g_free);
+ /* we allow subdissector to tell us more bytes */
+ pp->can_desegment=2;
+ /* subdissector call */
+ call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pp, NULL);
+ /* if the dissector need more bytes */
+ if(pp->desegment_len>0){
+ /* we remove data to forbid subdissection */
+ if(pinfo->fd)
+ {
+ p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
+ }
+ /* update of COL_INFO */
+ if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)){
+ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]");
+ pinfo->cinfo->writable=FALSE;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* we create SslPacketInfo to save data */
+ pi2=g_malloc(sizeof(SslPacketInfo));
+ pi2->app_data.data=g_malloc(ssl->app_data_segment.data_len);
+ memcpy(pi2->app_data.data,ssl->app_data_segment.data,ssl->app_data_segment.data_len);
+ pi2->app_data.data_len=ssl->app_data_segment.data_len;
+
+ /* we remove data if it's useful */
+ if(pinfo->fd)
+ {
+ p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
+ }
+ /* we add reassembled subprotocol data */
+ p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl, pi2);
+ /* we delete saved app_data */
+ if(ssl->app_data_segment.data)
+ g_free(ssl->app_data_segment.data);
+ ssl->app_data_segment.data=NULL;
+ ssl->app_data_segment.data_len=0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* we delete pp structure */
+ g_free(pp);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+}
/*********************************************************************
*
* Forward Declarations
@@ -1281,8 +921,8 @@
* (to keep cipher syncronized)and only if we have
* the server private key*/
if (!ssl_session->private_key || pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
- ssl_session = NULL;
-
+ ssl_session = NULL;
+
/* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we
* figure out what flavor of SSL it is (assuming we don't
* throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */
@@ -1304,7 +944,7 @@
* packets.
*
* Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets
- * may be possible using wireshark conversations, but
+ * may be possible using ethereal conversations, but
* probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream
* reassembly.
*/
@@ -1315,7 +955,6 @@
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ssl, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE);
ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl);
}
-
/* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */
while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) != 0)
{
@@ -1547,7 +1186,7 @@
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
- /*
+ /*
* Can we do reassembly?
*/
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
@@ -1660,7 +1299,7 @@
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN
&& ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, next_byte))
{
- if (version == 0x0300)
+ if (version == SSLV3_VERSION)
{
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv3;
if (ssl) {
@@ -1669,7 +1308,7 @@
}
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
- else if (version == 0x0301)
+ else if (version == TLSV1_VERSION)
{
*conv_version = SSL_VER_TLS;
@@ -1679,24 +1318,21 @@
}
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
+ else if (version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
+ {
+
+ *conv_version = SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1;
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl->version_netorder = version;
+ ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
+ }
+ /*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
+ }
}
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
{
- if (version == 0x0300)
- {
- col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
- ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_SSLv3]);
- }
- else if (version == 0x0301)
- {
- col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
- ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_TLS]);
- }
- else
- {
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
- }
}
/*
@@ -1716,12 +1352,23 @@
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec\n");
break;
case SSL_ID_ALERT:
- if (ssl)
- decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
- record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE);
- dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
- conv_version);
+ {
+ tvbuff_t* decrypted=0;
+ if (ssl&&decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
+ record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
+ ssl_add_record_info(pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
+ ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
+
+ /* try to retrive and use decrypted alert record, if any. */
+ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(pinfo, offset);
+ if (decrypted)
+ dissect_ssl3_alert(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0,
+ conv_version);
+ else
+ dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
+ conv_version);
break;
+ }
case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
{
tvbuff_t* decrypted=0;
@@ -1745,14 +1392,20 @@
break;
}
case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
- if (ssl)
- decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
- record_length, content_type, ssl, TRUE);
+ if (ssl){
+ decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
+ record_length, content_type, ssl, TRUE);
+ /* if application data desegmentation is allowed */
+ if(ssl_desegment_app_data)
+ ssl_desegment_ssl_app_data(ssl,pinfo);
+
+ }
+
/* show on info colum what we are decoding */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data");
-
+
if (!ssl_record_tree)
break;
@@ -1781,21 +1434,24 @@
/* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(pi->app_data.data,
pi->app_data.data_len, pi->app_data.data_len);
- tvb_set_free_cb(new_tvb, g_free);
- /* tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, new_tvb); */
-
+
+ /* add this tvb as a child to the original one */
+ tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, new_tvb);
+
+ /* add desegmented data to the data source list */
+ add_new_data_source(pinfo, new_tvb, "Decrypted SSL data");
+
/* find out a dissector using server port*/
if (association && association->handle) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found association %p\n", association);
ssl_print_text_data("decrypted app data",pi->app_data.data,
pi->app_data.data_len);
-
- call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree);
+ call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree);
}
/* add raw decrypted data only if a decoder is not found*/
else
proto_tree_add_string(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_appdata_decrypted, tvb,
- offset, pi->app_data.data_len, (char*) pi->app_data.data);
+ offset, pi->app_data.data_len, (char*) pi->app_data.data);
}
else {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length);
@@ -2092,7 +1748,7 @@
/* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes
* (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2)
*/
- if (ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLS)
+ if (ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLS||ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1)
{
encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
skip = 2;
@@ -2656,6 +2312,7 @@
switch(*conv_version) {
case SSL_VER_TLS:
+ case SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
tvb, offset, 12, FALSE);
break;
@@ -3799,7 +3456,7 @@
/* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
- if (version != 0x0300 && version != 0x0301)
+ if (version != SSLV3_VERSION && version != TLSV1_VERSION && version != TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3942,7 +3599,7 @@
/*********************************************************************
*
- * Standard Wireshark Protocol Registration and housekeeping
+ * Standard Ethereal Protocol Registration and housekeeping
*
*********************************************************************/
void
@@ -4359,6 +4016,11 @@
"Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments. "
"To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.",
&ssl_desegment);
+ prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module,
+ "desegment_ssl_application_data",
+ "Reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records",
+ "Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records. ",
+ &ssl_desegment_app_data);
prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list", "RSA keys list",
"comma separated list of private RSA keys used for SSL decryption; "
"each list entry must be in the form of <ip>:<port>:<key_file_name>"
@@ -4396,3 +4058,4 @@
/* add now dissector to default ports.*/
ssl_parse();
}
+
diff -Nru wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.c wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.c
--- wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.c 2006-06-15 09:45:45.000000000 +0200
+++ wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.c 2006-06-15 09:47:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* packet-ssl-utils.c
*
- * $Id: packet-ssl-utils.c 18081 2006-05-03 05:29:04Z etxrab $
+ * $Id: packet-ssl-utils.c 17645 2006-03-16 12:27:50Z jake $
*
* ssl manipulation functions
* By Paolo Abeni <paolo.abeni@xxxxxxxxx>
@@ -141,7 +141,33 @@
gcry_md_close(*(md));
}
-
+static int
+ssl_cipher_setiv(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher,unsigned char* iv, int iv_len)
+{
+ unsigned char * ivp;
+ int ret=0;
+ int i;
+ gcry_cipher_hd_t c;
+ c=(gcry_cipher_hd_t)*cipher;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
+ /*for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
+ i++;
+ }
+ */
+ ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
+ ret = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, iv_len);
+ /*for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
+ i++;
+ }
+ */
+ ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
+ return ret;
+}
/* stream cipher abstraction layer*/
static int
ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, int algo, unsigned char* sk,
@@ -350,7 +376,7 @@
"IDEA",
"AES",
"AES256",
- "*UNKNOWN*"
+ "*UNKNOWN*"
};
/* look in openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c for a complete list of available cipersuite*/
@@ -900,7 +926,9 @@
/* hash sequence number */
fmt_seq(decoder->seq,buf);
+
decoder->seq++;
+
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
/* hash content type */
@@ -984,17 +1012,62 @@
return(0);
}
-
+
+/*static int
+dtls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, int ct,int ver, guint8* data,
+ guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
+{
+ SSL_HMAC hm;
+ int md;
+ guint32 len;
+ guint8 buf[20];
+ guint32 netnum;
+ md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(digests[decoder->cipher_suite->dig-0x40]);
+ ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
+ digests[decoder->cipher_suite->dig-0x40], md);
+
+ ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md);
+ ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac seq: %d epoch: %d\n",decoder->seq,decoder->epoch);
+ /* hash sequence number *
+ fmt_seq(decoder->seq,buf);
+ buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8;
+ buf[1]=decoder->epoch;
+
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
+
+ /* hash content type *
+ buf[0]=ct;
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
+
+ /* hash version,data lenght and data*
+ *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(ver);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
+
+ *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(datalen);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
+ /* get digest and digest len*
+ ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
+ ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
+ if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
+ return -1;
+
+ ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
+ return(0);
+}*/
+
+
int
ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession*ssl,SslDecoder* decoder, int ct,
const unsigned char* in, int inl,unsigned char*out,int* outl)
{
int pad, worklen;
guint8 *mac;
-
+
+
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record ciphertext len %d\n", inl);
ssl_print_data("Ciphertext",in, inl);
-
+
/* First decrypt*/
if ((pad = ssl_cipher_decrypt(&decoder->evp,out,*outl,in,inl))!= 0)
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: %s %s\n", gcry_strsource (pad),
@@ -1020,21 +1093,37 @@
}
mac=out+worklen;
+ /* if TLS 1.1 we use the transmitted IV and remove it after (to not modify dissector in others parts)*/
+ if(ssl->version_netorder==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION){
+ worklen=worklen-decoder->cipher_suite->block;
+ memcpy(out,out+decoder->cipher_suite->block,worklen);
+ }
+ if(ssl->version_netorder==DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION){
+ worklen=worklen-decoder->cipher_suite->block;
+ memcpy(out,out+decoder->cipher_suite->block,worklen);
+ }
/* Now check the MAC */
ssl_debug_printf("checking mac (len %d, version %X, ct %d seq %d)\n",
worklen, ssl->version_netorder, ct, decoder->seq);
- if(ssl->version_netorder==0x300){
+ if(ssl->version_netorder==SSLV3_VERSION){
if(ssl3_check_mac(decoder,ct,out,worklen,mac) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
- else{
+ else if(ssl->version_netorder==TLSV1_VERSION || ssl->version_netorder==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION){
if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->version_netorder,out,worklen,mac)< 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
+ else if(ssl->version_netorder==DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION){
+ /* follow the openssl dtls errors the rigth test is : dtls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->version_netorder,out,worklen,mac)< 0 */
+ if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,TLSV1_VERSION,out,worklen,mac)< 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
*outl = worklen;
return(0);
@@ -1261,6 +1350,8 @@
ssl_session->client_random.data = ssl_session->_client_random;
ssl_session->server_random.data = ssl_session->_server_random;
ssl_session->master_secret.data_len = 48;
+ ssl_session->app_data_segment.data=NULL;
+ ssl_session->app_data_segment.data_len=0;
}
#ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG
diff -Nru wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.h wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.h
--- wireshark-rev18467/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.h 2006-06-15 09:45:45.000000000 +0200
+++ wireshark_patched/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.h 2006-06-15 09:47:06.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* packet-ssl-utils.h
*
- * $Id: packet-ssl-utils.h 18081 2006-05-03 05:29:04Z etxrab $
+ * $Id: packet-ssl-utils.h 17303 2006-02-14 18:52:26Z gerald $
*
* ssl manipulation functions
* By Paolo Abeni <paolo.abeni@xxxxxxxxx>
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <gnutls/x509.h>
#include <gnutls/openssl.h>
+#include <epan/value_string.h>
/* #define SSL_FAST 1 */
#define SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG
@@ -50,6 +51,506 @@
#define SSL_PRIVATE_KEY void
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
+ /* The TCP port to associate with by default */
+#define TCP_PORT_SSL 443
+#define TCP_PORT_SSL_LDAP 636
+#define TCP_PORT_SSL_IMAP 993
+#define TCP_PORT_SSL_POP 995
+
+/* version state tables */
+#define SSL_VER_UNKNOWN 0
+#define SSL_VER_SSLv2 1
+#define SSL_VER_SSLv3 2
+#define SSL_VER_TLS 3
+#define SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1 4
+#define SSL_VER_DTLS 5
+#define SSL_VER_PCT 6
+
+/* corresponds to the #defines above */
+
+static const gchar* ssl_version_short_names[] = {
+ "SSL",
+ "SSLv2",
+ "SSLv3",
+ "TLSv1",
+ "TLSv1.1",
+ "DTLSv1.0",
+ "PCT"
+};
+
+/* other defines */
+#define SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC 0x14
+#define SSL_ID_ALERT 0x15
+#define SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE 0x16
+#define SSL_ID_APP_DATA 0x17
+
+#define SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST 0
+#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+#define SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO 2
+#define SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
+#define SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE 11
+#define SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG 12
+#define SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST 13
+#define SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE 14
+#define SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY 15
+#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG 16
+#define SSL_HND_FINISHED 20
+
+#define SSL2_HND_ERROR 0x00
+#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
+#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x02
+#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x03
+#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO 0x04
+#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY 0x05
+#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED 0x06
+#define SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 0x07
+#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 0x08
+
+#define PCT_VERSION_1 0x8001
+
+#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
+#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO 0x02
+#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x03
+#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY 0x04
+#define PCT_MSG_ERROR 0x05
+
+#define PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1 0xa
+
+#define PCT_CIPHER_DES 0x01
+#define PCT_CIPHER_IDEA 0x02
+#define PCT_CIPHER_RC2 0x03
+#define PCT_CIPHER_RC4 0x04
+#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_112 0x05
+#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_168 0x06
+
+#define PCT_HASH_MD5 0x0001
+#define PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64 0x0002
+#define PCT_HASH_SHA 0x0003
+#define PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80 0x0004
+#define PCT_HASH_DES_DM 0x0005
+
+#define PCT_CERT_NONE 0x00
+#define PCT_CERT_X509 0x01
+#define PCT_CERT_PKCS7 0x02
+
+#define PCT_SIG_NONE 0x0000
+#define PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5 0x0001
+#define PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA 0x0002
+#define PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA 0x0003
+
+#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1 0x01
+#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES 0x02
+#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3 0x03
+#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2 0x04
+#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4 0x05
+#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3 0x06
+#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES 0x07
+#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3 0x08
+#define PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN 0x09
+
+#define PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x01
+#define PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED 0x02
+#define PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE 0x03
+#define PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED 0x04
+#define PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED 0x05
+#define PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH 0x06
+
+/*
+ * Lookup tables
+ *
+ */
+static const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = {
+ { SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" },
+ { SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
+ { SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
+ { SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" },
+ { SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = {
+ { 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
+ { 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
+ { 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
+ security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
+ { 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ { 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ /* Microsoft's old PCT protocol. These are from Eric Rescorla's
+ book "SSL and TLS" */
+ { 0x8f8001, "PCT_SSL_COMPAT | PCT_VERSION_1" },
+ { 0x800003, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509_CHAIN" },
+ { 0x800001, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509" },
+ { 0x810001, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_MD5" },
+ { 0x810003, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_SHA" },
+ { 0x820001, "PCT_SSL_EXCH_TYPE | PCT1_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1" },
+ { 0x830004, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF | PCT1_CIPHER_RC4" },
+ { 0x848040, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_128 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
+ { 0x842840, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_40 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
+ /* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in
+ * a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte
+ * tls cipher suite id
+ */
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = {
+ { 0x00, "N/A" },
+ { 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = {
+ { 20, "Change Cipher Spec" },
+ { 21, "Alert" },
+ { 22, "Handshake" },
+ { 23, "Application Data" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_versions[] = {
+ { 0x0100, "DTLS 1.0" },
+ { 0x0302, "TLS 1.1" },
+ { 0x0301, "TLS 1.0" },
+ { 0x0300, "SSL 3.0" },
+ { 0x0002, "SSL 2.0" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
+ message. */
+static const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
+ { 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+#endif
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
+ { 1, "Warning" },
+ { 2, "Fatal" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = {
+ { 0, "Close Notify" },
+ { 10, "Unexpected Message" },
+ { 20, "Bad Record MAC" },
+ { 21, "Decryption Failed" },
+ { 22, "Record Overflow" },
+ { 30, "Decompression Failure" },
+ { 40, "Handshake Failure" },
+ { 42, "Bad Certificate" },
+ { 43, "Unsupported Certificate" },
+ { 44, "Certificate Revoked" },
+ { 45, "Certificate Expired" },
+ { 46, "Certificate Unknown" },
+ { 47, "Illegal Parameter" },
+ { 48, "Unknown CA" },
+ { 49, "Access Denied" },
+ { 50, "Decode Error" },
+ { 51, "Decrypt Error" },
+ { 60, "Export Restriction" },
+ { 70, "Protocol Version" },
+ { 71, "Insufficient Security" },
+ { 80, "Internal Error" },
+ { 90, "User Canceled" },
+ { 100, "No Renegotiation" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = {
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" },
+ { SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
+ { SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "Hello Verify Request"},
+ { SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" },
+ { SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" },
+ { SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" },
+ { SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" },
+ { SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
+ { 0, "null" },
+ { 1, "ZLIB" },
+ { 64, "LZS" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
+ seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
+static const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0, "RSA" },
+ { 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0, "Anonymous" },
+ { 1, "RSA" },
+ { 2, "DSA" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+#endif
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
+ { 1, "RSA Sign" },
+ { 2, "DSS Sign" },
+ { 3, "RSA Fixed DH" },
+ { 4, "DSS Fixed DH" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchange keys, as would be
+ seen in a client key exchange message. */
+static const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
+ { 0, "Implicit" },
+ { 1, "Explicit" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+#endif
+
+static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
+ { 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
+ { 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
+ { 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x0048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x0049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
+ security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
+ { 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ { 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ /* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+static const value_string pct_msg_types[] = {
+ { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
+ { PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
+ { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
+ { PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
+ { PCT_MSG_ERROR, "Error" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string pct_cipher_type[] = {
+ { PCT_CIPHER_DES, "DES" },
+ { PCT_CIPHER_IDEA, "IDEA" },
+ { PCT_CIPHER_RC2, "RC2" },
+ { PCT_CIPHER_RC4, "RC4" },
+ { PCT_CIPHER_DES_112, "DES 112 bit" },
+ { PCT_CIPHER_DES_168, "DES 168 bit" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string pct_hash_type[] = {
+ { PCT_HASH_MD5, "MD5" },
+ { PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64, "MD5_TRUNC_64"},
+ { PCT_HASH_SHA, "SHA"},
+ { PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80, "SHA_TRUNC_80"},
+ { PCT_HASH_DES_DM, "DES_DM"},
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string pct_cert_type[] = {
+ { PCT_CERT_NONE, "None" },
+ { PCT_CERT_X509, "X.509" },
+ { PCT_CERT_PKCS7, "PKCS #7" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+static const value_string pct_sig_type[] = {
+ { PCT_SIG_NONE, "None" },
+ { PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5, "MD5" },
+ { PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA, "RSA SHA" },
+ { PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA, "DSA SHA" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string pct_exch_type[] = {
+ { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1, "RSA PKCS#1" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES, "RSA PKCS#1 Token DES" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3, "RSA PKCS#1 Token 3DES" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-2" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-4" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3, "DH PKCS#3" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES, "DH PKCS#3 Token DES" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3, "DH PKCS#3 Token 3DES" },
+ { PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN, "Fortezza" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string pct_error_code[] = {
+ { PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, "PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE" },
+ { PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILE" },
+ { PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE, "PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE" },
+ { PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED" },
+ { PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED" },
+ { PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH, "PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH" },
+ { 0x00, NULL },
+};
+
+/* RFC 3546 */
+static const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[] = {
+ { 0, "server_name" },
+ { 1, "max_fragment_length" },
+ { 2, "client_certificate_url" },
+ { 3, "trusted_ca_keys" },
+ { 4, "truncated_hmac" },
+ { 5, "status_request" },
+ { 35, "EAP-FAST PAC-Opaque" /* draft-cam-winget-eap-fast-00.txt */ },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
typedef struct _StringInfo {
unsigned char* data;
unsigned int data_len;
@@ -59,6 +560,8 @@
#define SSLV3_VERSION 0x300
#define TLSV1_VERSION 0x301
+#define TLSV1DOT1_VERSION 0x302
+#define DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION 0x100
#define SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM 1
#define SSL_SERVER_RANDOM 2
@@ -92,6 +595,7 @@
StringInfo mac_key;
SSL_CIPHER_CTX evp;
guint32 seq;
+ guint16 epoch;
} SslDecoder;
#define KEX_RSA 0x10
@@ -145,7 +649,8 @@
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY* private_key;
guint32 version;
guint16 version_netorder;
-
+ StringInfo app_data_segment;
+
} SslDecryptSession;
/** Initialize decryption engine/ssl layer. To be called once per execution */
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- From: Joerg Mayer
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