Ethereal-dev: Re: [ethereal-dev] Error in certificate request parsing in packet-isakmp.c
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From: "Yaniv Kaul" <ykaul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2000 09:40:06 +0200
Attached is the Config draft from which I've taken the data.
1. reserved2 is 1 byte long only!
2. identifier is indeed in network order and should be converted.
3. What about cert_hdr structure? It is identical to certreq_hdr structure,
so possibly "suffers" from the same problem.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Guy Harris" <gharris@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Guy Harris" <gharris@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Yaniv Kaul" <ykaul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; <ethereal-dev@xxxxxxxx>; "Brad
Robel-Forrest" <brad.robel-forrest@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2000 5:17 AM
Subject: Re: [ethereal-dev] Error in certificate request parsing in
packet-isakmp.c
> On Sat, Jul 01, 2000 at 07:13:06PM -0700, Guy Harris wrote:
> > I'll see whether making it
> >
> > struct certreq_hdr {
> > guint8 next_payload;
> > guint8 reserved;
> > guint8 length[2];
> > guint8 cert_type;
> > };
> >
> > fixes the problem.
>
> It looks as if it did (although I'm not an ISAKMP expert - all I know
> about ISAKMP I learned in kindergarten^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^Ha quick
> look at some bits of RFC 2408).
>
> Here's a patch which changes all the structures.
>
>
> Making that change turned up another problem - changing "identifier" in
> "struct cfg_hdr" from "guint16 identifier" to "guint8 identifier[2]"
> caused a warning in the statement
>
> proto_tree_add_text(ntree, NullTVB, offset, sizeof(hdr->identifier),
> "Identifier: %u",hdr->identifier);
>
> I suspect that if "identifier" is truly an integral data type, it needs
> to be converted from network byte order to host byte order, so the right
> fix is to change that code to
>
> proto_tree_add_text(ntree, NullTVB, offset, sizeof(hdr->identifier),
> "Identifier: %u", pntohs(&hdr->identifier));
>
> In addition, the structure was
>
> struct cfg_hdr {
> guint8 next_payload;
> guint8 reserved;
> guint8 length;
> guint8 type;
> guint8 reserved2;
> guint16 identifier;
> };
>
> which consists, on most if not all platforms, of:
>
> one byte of "next_payload";
>
> one reserved byte;
>
> one byte of length;
>
> one byte of type;
>
> another reserved byte;
>
> a padding byte to put "identifier" on a 16-bit boundary;
>
> 2 bytes of identifier.
>
> Changing it to
>
> struct cfg_hdr {
> guint8 next_payload;
> guint8 reserved;
> guint8 length;
> guint8 type;
> guint8 reserved2;
> guint8 identifier[2];
> };
>
> removes the padding byte, thus changing the location of "identifier".
>
> That structure doesn't seem to be described in RFC 2408, so I don't know
> whether "reserved2" is really 2 bytes:
>
> struct cfg_hdr {
> guint8 next_payload;
> guint8 reserved;
> guint8 length;
> guint8 type;
> guint8 reserved2[2];
> guint8 identifier[2];
> };
>
> or if "identifier" truly *isn't* aligned on a natural (16-bit) boundary
> (in which case the old "guint16 identifier" version was wrong), or if
> "length" is 2 bytes as it is in the other headers:
>
> struct cfg_hdr {
> guint8 next_payload;
> guint8 reserved;
> guint8 length[2];
> guint8 type;
> guint8 reserved2;
> guint8 identifier[2];
> };
>
> or if something else is the case.
>
> Given that a "struct cfg_hdr" is dissected by 'dissect_config()", which
> does
>
> guint16 length = pntohs(&hdr->length);
>
> which is incorrect unless "length" is a 16-bit field, I suspect that the
> problem is that "length" should be 2 bytes, so that's what I'll check
> in, and what's in the patch attached to this message.
>
Internet Engineering Task Force R. Pereira, TimeStep Corp.
IP Security Working Group S. Anand, Microsoft Corp.
Internet Draft B. Patel, Intel Corp.
Expires in six months
May 13, 1998
The ISAKMP Configuration Method
<draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-04.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is a submission to the IETF Internet Protocol
Security (IPSECond) Working Group. Comments are solicited and
should be addressed to the working group mailing list
(ipsec@xxxxxxx) or to the editor.
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet Drafts.
Internet-Drafts draft documents are valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other
documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
progress."
To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check
the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts
Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net
(Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au
(Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu
(US West Coast).
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes a new ISAKMP method that allows
configuration items to be exchanged securely by using both
push/acknowledge or request/reply paradigms.
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 1]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
1.1. Reader Prerequisites.......................................2
1.2. Specification of Requirements..............................3
2. Configuration Transaction......................................3
3. Configuration Method Exchange and Payload......................4
3.1. Transaction Exchanges......................................4
3.1.1. Protected Exchanges...................................4
3.1.2. Unprotected Exchanges.................................5
3.2. Attribute Payload..........................................5
3.3. Configuration Message Types................................6
3.4. Configuration Attributes...................................6
3.5. Retransmission.............................................8
4. Exchange Positioning...........................................8
5. Examples.......................................................8
5.1. Example 1: Requesting an Internal Address..................8
5.2. Example 2: Central Configuration Manager...................9
5.3. Example 3: Requesting Peer's Version.......................9
6. Enterprise Management Considerations..........................10
7. Security Considerations.......................................10
8. References....................................................10
9. Acknowledgments...............................................11
10. Editors' Addresses...........................................11
11. Full Copyright Statement.....................................12
1. Introduction
The ISAKMP protocol provides a framework to negotiate and generate
Security Associations. While negotiating SAs, it is sometimes
quite useful to retrieve certain information from the other peer
before the non-ISAKMP SA can be established. Luckily, ISAKMP is
also flexible enough to provide configuration information and do it
securely. This document will present a mechanism to extend ISAKMP
to provide such functionality.
1.1. Reader Prerequisites
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and
concepts described in the "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol" [ArchSec] and "IP Security Document Roadmap" [Thayer97]
documents.
Readers are advised to be familiar with both [IKE] and [ISAKMP]
because of the terminology used within this document and the fact
that this document is an extension of both of those documents.
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 2]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
1.2. Specification of Requirements
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
NOT", and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted
as described in [Bradner97].
2. Configuration Transaction
A "Configuration Transaction" is defined as two configuration
exchanges, the first being either a Set or a Request and the second
being either an Acknowledge or a Reply, respectively. A common
identifier is used to identify the transaction between exchanges.
There are two paradigms to follow for this method.
o "Set/Acknowledge" works on the push principle that allows a
configuration manager (a host that wishes to send information to
another host) to start the configuration transaction. This code
sends attributes that it wants the peer to alter. The
Acknowledge code MUST return the zero length attributes that it
accepted. Those attributes that it did not accept will NOT be
sent back in the acknowledgement.
Initiator Responder
--------------- -------------------
SET -->
<-- ACKNOWLEDGE
o "Request/Reply" allows a host to request information from an
informed host (a configuration manager). If the attributes in
the Request message are not empty, then these attributes are
taken as suggestions for that attribute. The Reply message MAY
wish to choose those values, or return new values. It MAY also
add new attributes and not include some requested attributes.
Initiator Responder
--------------- --------------
REQUEST -->
<-- REPLY
Transactions are completed once the Reply or Acknowledge code is
received. If one is not received, the implementation MAY wish to
retransmit the original exchange as detailed in a later section.
The initiator and responder are not necessarily the same as the
initiator and responder of the ISAKMP exchange.
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 3]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
If a badly formatted exchange is received, the message SHOULD be
silently discarded and MAY be logged locally, as per local policy.
Badly formatted exchanges MIGHT include those with unknown codes or
unknown attributes.
3. Configuration Method Exchange and Payload
3.1. Transaction Exchanges
A new exchange mode is required for the configuration method. This
exchange is called the "Transaction Exchange" and has a value of 6.
This exchange is quite similar to the Information exchange
described in [ISAKMP] and [IKE], but allows for multi-exchange
transactions instead of being a one-way transmittal of information.
This specification protects ISAKMP Transaction Exchanges when
possible.
3.1.1. Protected Exchanges
Once the ISAKMP security association has been established (and
SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a have been generated), the ISAKMP Transaction
Exchange is as follows:
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
HDR*, HASH, ATTR -->
<-- HDR*, HASH, ATTR
Where the HASH payload contains the prf output, using SKEYID_a as
the key, and the M-ID (ISAKMP header Message ID) unique to this
exchange concatenated with the all of the payloads after the HASH
payload. In other words, the hash for the above exchange is:
HASH = prf( SKEYID_a, M-ID | ATTR )
Note that more than one ATTR payload MAY be after the HASH payload
and each ATTR payload represents an individual transaction:
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
HDR*, HASH, ATTR1, ATTR2 -->
<-- HDR*, HASH, ATTR1, ATTR2
HASH = prf( SKEYID_a, M-ID | ATTR1 | ATTR2 )
As noted, the message ID in the ISAKMP header-- as used in the prf
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 4]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
computation-- is unique to this exchange and MUST NOT be the same
as the message ID of another exchange. The derivation of the
initialization vector (IV) for the first message, used with
SKEYID_e to encrypt the message, is described in Appendix B of
[IKE]. Subsequent IVs are taken from the last ciphertext block of
the previous message as described in [IKE].
3.1.2. Unprotected Exchanges
If the ISAKMP security association has not yet been established at
the time of the Transaction Exchange, the exchange is done in the
clear without an accompanying HASH payload.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
HDR, ATTR -->
<-- HDR, ATTR
Multiple ATTR payloads MAY be present in the Transaction Exchange
with each representing an individual transaction.
3.2. Attribute Payload
A new payload is defined to carry attributes as well as the type of
transaction message.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Next Payload ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Type ! RESERVED ! Identifier !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ Attributes ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Attributes Payload fields are defined as follows:
o Next Payload (1 octet) - Identifier for the payload type of the
next payload in the message. If the current payload is the last
in the message, then this field will be 0.
o RESERVED (1 octet) - Unused, set to 0.
o Payload Length (2 octets) - Length in octets of the current
payload, including the generic payload header, the transaction-
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 5]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
specific header and all attributes. If the length does not
match the length of the payload headers plus the attributes,
(i.e. an attribute is half contained within this payload) then
entire payload MUST be discarded.
o Attribute Message Type (1 octet) - Specifies the type of message
represented by the attributes. These are defined in the next
section.
o RESERVED (1 octet) - Unused, set to 0.
o Identifier (2 octets) - An identifier used to reference a
configuration transaction within the individual messages.
o Attributes (variable length) - Zero or more ISAKMP Data
Attributes as defined in [ISAKMP]. The attribute types are
defined in a later section.
The payload type for the Attributes Payload is fourteen (14).
3.3. Configuration Message Types
Types Value
========================== ===========
RESERVED 0
ISKAMP_CFG_REQUEST 1
ISKAMP_CFG_REPLY 2
ISKAMP_CFG_SET 3
ISKAMP_CFG_ACK 4
Reserved for Future Use 5-127
Reserved for Private Use 128-255
Messages with unknown types SHOULD be silently discarded.
3.4. Configuration Attributes
Zero or more ISAKMP attributes [ISAKMP] are contained within an
Attributes Payload. The following attributes are currently defined:
Attribute Value Type Length
====================== ======= ================ ===================
RESERVED 0
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS 1 Variable 0 or 4 octets
INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK 2 Variable 0 or 4 octets
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS 3 Variable 0 or 4 octets
INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS 4 Variable 0 or 4 octets
INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY 5 Basic/Variable 0 or 2 or 4 octets
INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP 6 Variable 0 or 4 octets
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 6]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
APPLICATION_VERSION 7 Variable variable
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS 8 Variable 0 or 16 octets
INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK 9 Variable 0 or 16 octets
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS 10 Variable 0 or 16 octets
INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS 11 Variable 0 or 16 octets
INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP 12 Variable 0 or 16 octets
Reserved for future use 13-16383
Private use 16384-32767
o INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS, INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS - Specifies an
address within the internal network. This address is sometimes
called a red node address or a private address and MAY be a
private address on the Internet. Multiple internal addresses
MAY be requested. The responder MAY only send up to the number
of addresses requested.
The requested address is valid until the expiry time defined
with the INTERNAL_ADDRESS EXPIRY attribute or until the ISAKMP
SA that was used to secure the request expires. The address MAY
also expire when the IPSec (phase 2) SA expires, if the request
is associated with a phase 2 negotiation. If no ISAKMP SA was
used to secure the request, then the response MUST include an
expiry or the host MUST expire the SA after an implementation-
defined time.
o INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK, INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK - The internal
network's netmask. Only one netmask is allowed in the request
and reply messages. (e.g. 255.255.255.0)
o INTERNAL_IP4_DNS, INTERNAL_IP6_DNS - Specifies an address of a
DNS server within the network. Multiple DNS servers MAY be
requested. The responder MAY respond with zero or more DNS
server attributes.
o INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS, INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS - Specifies an address of a
NetBios Name Server (WINS) within the network. Multiple NBNS
servers MAY be requested. The responder MAY respond with zero
or more NBNS server attributes.
o INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY - Specifies the number of seconds that
the host can use the internal IP address. The host MUST renew
the IP address before this expiry time. Only one attribute MAY
be present in the reply.
o INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP, INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP - Instructs the host to
send any internal DHCP requests to the address contained within
the attribute. Multiple DHCP servers MAY be requested. The
responder MAY respond with zero or more DHCP server attributes.
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 7]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
o APPLICATION_VERSION - The version or application information of
the IPSec host. This is a string of printable ASCII characters
that is NOT null terminated. This attribute does not need to be
secured.
It is hoped that more attribute types will be defined in future
documents. Some suggestions would be to distribute local policy,
or even authenticate certificates.
Note that no recommendations are made in this document how an
implementation actually figures out what information to send in a
reply. i.e. we do not recommend any specific method of (an edge
device) determining which DNS server should be returned to a
requesting host.
3.5. Retransmission
Retransmission SHOULD follow the same retransmission rules used
with standard ISAKMP messages.
4. Exchange Positioning
The exchange and messages defined within this document MAY appear
at any time. Because of security consideration with certain
attributes, the exchange SHOULD be secured with a ISAKMP phase 1
SA.
Depending on the type of transaction and the information being
exchanged, the exchange MAY be dependant on an ISAKMP phase 1 SA
negotiation, a phase 2 SA negotiation, or none of the above.
5. Examples
Some examples of this configuration method follow. These are meant
only as examples and should not be thought of as the only
possibilities for this protocol.
5.1. Example 1: Requesting an Internal Address
Initiator requesting their internal IP address from an edge device
by a mobile host.
Initiator Responder
----------------------------- --------------------------------
HDR*, HASH, ATTR1(REQUEST) -->
<-- HDR*, HASH, ATTR2(REPLY)
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 8]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
ATTR1(REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_ADDRESS(0.0.0.0)
INTERNAL_NETMASK(0.0.0.0)
INTERNAL_DNS(0.0.0.0)
ATTR2(REPLY) =
INTERNAL_ADDRESS(192.168.219.202)
INTERNAL_NETMASK(255.255.255.0)
INTERNAL_DNS(291.168.219.4)
INTERNAL_DNS(291.168.219.5)
This Transaction Exchange would occur after an ISAKMP phase 1 SA
had already occurred and before an ISAKMP phase 2 negotiation
started, since that negotiation requires the internal address.
Initial Negotiation:
MainMode or AggressiveMode
TransactionMode (IP Address request)
QuickMode
5.2. Example 2: Central Configuration Manager
A central configuration manager application sends out policy
information to an IPSec host.
Initiator Responder
----------------------------- --------------------------
HDR*, HASH, ATTR1(SET) -->
<-- HDR*, HASH, ATTR2(ACK)
ATTR1(SET) =
X_POLICY_SECURITY_LEVEL(High)
ATTR2(ACK) =
X_POLICY_SECURITY_LEVEL()
5.3. Example 3: Requesting Peer's Version
An IPSec host inquires about the peer's version information (with
or without security).
Initiator Responder
----------------------------- --------------------------
HDR, ATTR1(REQUEST) -->
<-- HDR, ATTR2(REPLY)
ATTR1(REQUEST) =
APPLICATION_VERSION("")
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 9]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
ATTR2(REPLY) =
APPLICATION_VERSION("foobar v1.3beta, (c) Foo Bar Inc.")
6. Enterprise Management Considerations
The method defined in this document SHOULD NOT be used for wide
scale management. Its main intent is to provide a bootstrap
mechanism to exchange information within IPSec. While it MAY be
useful to use such a method of exchange information to some
outlying IPSec hosts or small networks, existing management
protocols such as DHCP [DHCP], RADIUS [RADIUS], SNMP or LDAP [LDAP]
should be considered for enterprise management as well as
subsequent information exchanges.
7. Security Considerations
This entire draft discusses a new ISAKMP configuration method to
allow IPSec-enabled entities to acquire and share configuration
information.
The draft mandates that this exchange should normally occur after
the Phase I Security Association has been set up and that the
entire exchange be protected by that Phase I SA. Thus the exchange
is as secure as any Phase II SA negotiation.
This exchange MAY be secured (encrypted and authenticated) by other
means as well, such as pre-configured ESP or data-link security.
8. References
[ArchSec] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-arch-sec-04
[Bradner97] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC2119
[ISAKMP] D. Maughan, M. Schertler, M. Schneider, J. Turner,
"Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-09
[IKE] D. Harkins, D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-07
[DHCP] R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC2131
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 10]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
[RADIUS] C. Rigney, A. Rubens, W. Simpson, S. Willens, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC2138
[LDAP] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille., "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3)", RFC2251
9. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank Tim Jenkins, Peter Ford, Bob
Moskowitz and Shawn Mamros.
10. Editors' Addresses
Roy Pereira
rpereira@xxxxxxxxxxxx
TimeStep Corporation
+1 (613) 599-3610 x 4808
Sanjay Anand
sanjayan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Microsoft Corporation
+1 (206) 936-6367
Baiju V. Patel
baiju@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Intel Corporation
+1 (503) 264 2422
The IPSec working group can be contacted via the IPSec working
group's mailing list (ipsec@xxxxxxx) or through its chairs:
Robert Moskowitz
rgm@xxxxxxxx
International Computer Security Association
Theodore Y. Ts'o
tytso@xxxxxxx
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 11]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method May, 98
11. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain
it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied,
published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction
of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this
paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works.
However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such
as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet
Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the
purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the
procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process
must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages
other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on
an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel [Page 12]
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